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Increasingly, so-called weak actors employ irregular warfare to successfully challenge 
the strong. The British, French, and Americans are recognized for their irregular warfare 
experience, but the comparatively rich German tradition remains overlooked. German 
contributions to irregular warfare, in fact, rival their reputed expertise in modern 
maneuver warfare.  
This thesis surveys German irregular warfare cases from the eighteenth century 
forward. Beginning in the American Revolution, Hessian officer Johann Ewald revealed 
important counter-insurgency principles. In the early nineteenth century, Carl von 
Clausewitz spoke to the larger idea of people’s war and noted its efficacy. In a peripheral 
theater of World War I, Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck mastered the art of irregular adaptation 
and survival. In the Second World War, Otto Skorzeny perfected the strategic commando 
raid. After serving in the same war, Friedrich A.F. von der Heydte published a theory of 
modern irregular warfare, unique for its views on terrorism and the combined 
employment of irregular and other forms of warfare. Otto Heilbrunn studied partisan 
warfare and endorsed pseudo operations to counter asymmetric threats such as those 
faced by the United States today. German irregular warfare offers strategic answers to 
contemporary security challenges. 
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Irregular warfare has become the global norm, while conventional state-versus-
state conflict has grown rare.1 This is likely a function of the increasingly large 
conventional force advantages enjoyed by powerful nations driven by their 
unprecedented investments in technology and military equipment. Weaker states and 
non-state actors are forced to adopt unconventional means and strategies to overcome the 
existing disparity.2 Groups such as Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Islamic State reinforce 
this notion. Each has frustrated and challenged the United States in recent years. Their 
military successes against the world’s sole recognized super power imply the need for 
further attention to be given to the study of irregular warfare.  
Traditionally, the U.S. military has focused its study of this subject on the British, 
French, and even its own historical experiences. Lacking in this case is the rich vein of 
thought to be mined from the German irregular warfare tradition. Most often associated 
with the rise of modern maneuver warfare, the Germans nevertheless have much to 
contribute to the more irregular realm of combat. This thesis surveys German irregular 
warfare in practice and theory from the eighteenth century forward to identify important 
lessons and themes. 
A. WHAT IS IRREGULAR WARFARE? 
To begin, the term “irregular warfare” needs to be better understood. According to 
the U.S. Military Joint Publication 1–02 (2010), irregular warfare constitutes, “A violent 
struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant 
population(s).”3 This definition is vague in its use of the term “violent struggle,” which 
                                                 
1 Michael T. Klare notes that, of the 50 armed conflicts that broke out in the 1990s, only four entailed 
conflict between two or more states, and only one—the Persian Gulf War—involved all-out fighting 
between large numbers of air, ground, and sea forces; Michael T. Klare, “The New Face of Combat: 
Terrorism and Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century,” in The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, 
Causes, Controls, ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 29. 
2 Christopher Paul, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 188.  
3 Department of Defense. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JP 1–02), 2010, 170. 
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inadequately accounts for the numerous operational and strategic irregular warfare 
options. The definition is also restrictive in its designated purpose, that being “for 
legitimacy and influence over the relevant population.” Although often the case, this is 
not always true. For instance, the purpose of the U.S. raid to kill Osama Bin Laden did 
not conform to the above definition, but can be classified as irregular warfare. 
Another U.S. military definition (2006), states that, “irregular warfare has its 
objective maintaining or undermining the legitimacy of a political authority by the 
application of indirect approaches and non-conventional means to defeat an enemy by 
subversion, attrition, or exhaustion rather than direct military confrontation.”4 This more 
comprehensive and specific definition is better, but still remains too narrow in scope. As 
author and strategist John Arquilla correctly points out, “Efforts to simplify the concept 
of irregular warfare have tended to slight the complex elements that are so necessary to a 
proper understanding of the phenomenon.”5 In other words, it is useful to understand the 
subject of irregular warfare broadly for that engenders greater understanding and 
creativity in employment. 
Arquilla more aptly gets at the nature of irregular warfare, stating:  
Parity, as existed between the leading states at the outset of World War I 
in 1914, is rare. In a world of unfair fights, only human creativity allows 
the chance to take on one’s betters with some hope of prevailing. So it is 
that an innovative turn of mind toward unusual tactics and strategies, 
arising largely in response to material inferiority, lies at the heart of 
conflict’s area of greatest complexity: irregular warfare.6 
This description begins by acknowledging what irregular warfare is not, and then 
distills the nature of irregular warfare down to its fundamental characteristics. 
Importantly, it acknowledges the idea of unfair fights, or situations where one combatant 
                                                 
4 J. N. Mattis and Eric T. Olson, “Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare. Version 2.0” (U.S. 
Marine Corps Combat Development Command and U.S. Special Operations Command Center for 
Knowledge and Futures, 2006), 5. 
5 John Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped 
Our World (Chicago : [Lanham, Md.]: Ivan R. Dee ; Distributed by National Book Network, 2011), 7. 
6 Ibid., 3. 
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suffers significant resource, capability, or other structural combat disadvantages in 
comparison to its adversary.  
German irregular-warfare strategist, Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte, 
advances a step further in specificity: 
Usually irregular warfare is conceived to be an armed conflict, in which 
the parties are not large units, but small and very small action-groups, and 
in which the outcome is not decided in a few large battles, but the decision 
is sought, and ultimately achieved, in a very large number of small, 
individual operations, robberies, acts of terrorism and sabotage, bombings 
and other attacks. Irregular warfare is “war out of the dark.” In place of the 
powerful thrust, there is a multiplicity of no less dangerous pin-pricks; 
instead of superiority of weapons—and therefore firepower in the broadest 
sense—there is the superiority of movement, which the enemy is no longer 
able to pursue.7 
Von der Heydte’s informal, yet effective, definition of irregular warfare highlights 
the following key characteristics: action by small groups, the cumulative effect of 
unconventional and small operations over time, and a priority toward freedom of 
movement and stealth. To elaborate further, irregular warfare operations may include, or 
be associated with: insurgencies and counter-insurgencies, unconventional warfare, 
revolutions, commando raids, terrorism, kidnappings, subversion, and sabotage. These 
examples, combined with Arquilla’s conceptual view and von der Heydte’s more 
practical definition, establish a basic understanding and departure point for deeper 
research into the German experience.  
B. THE GERMANIC PERSPECTIVE 
The Germanic peoples are well known for their militaristic history and 
orientation. Dating back to the time of Caesar’s Gallic Wars in the first century B.C., 
Germans enjoyed a strong military reputation. At that time, the contemporary German 
state consisted of various loosely affiliated Germanic tribes such as the Cimbri, Suebi, 
Teutoni, and Harudes. According to Caesar, under the leadership of Ariovistus, these 
tribes excelled in combined cavalry-infantry operations during frequent raids into 
                                                 
7 Friedrich August Heydte, Modern Irregular Warfare: In Defense Policy and as a Military 
Phenomenon, 1st English ed. (New York, NY: New Benjamin Franklin House, 1986), 3–4. 
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neighboring Gaul. They developed a reputation for bravery, weapon skills, and savagery, 
and they benefited from an ability and willingness to sustain longer campaigns than their 
enemies.8 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, three German military leaders are 
credited with developing many of the principles still applied to conventional warfare 
today. Frederick the Great (1712–1786) ruled Prussia for 46 years, during which he 
strengthened Prussia’s position through hard-won victory in the Seven Years’ War. He 
also devised many significant tactical advances. Prussian general and theorist Carl von 
Clausewitz (1780–1831) wrote On War, which is perhaps the single most influential book 
ever written on military theory and strategy. Finally, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder 
(1800–1891) served as Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army for 30 years. In this capacity, 
he contributed lasting theoretical advances in the subjects of military planning, logistics, 
and leadership.  
More recently, German military history includes the heinous acts committed 
during the period of the Third Reich under Adolf Hitler. Many of Hitler’s conventional 
force commanders, however, such as Heinz Guderian and Erwin Rommel, are praised 
today for their operational and tactical expertise. Meanwhile, other leaders in the Nazi 
organization proved to be masters of the irregular warfare realm. The Nazi propaganda 
minister Paul Joseph Goebbels and Nazi Waffen-SS commander Otto Skorzeny were 
both recognized for their expertise in political warfare and commando operations 
respectively. 
In addition to conventional war theory, German history is rich with irregular 
warfare strategic thinkers and practitioners, but they are comparatively lesser known in 
the broader study of the subject. This thesis conducts a survey of German irregular 
warfare literature and history from the eighteenth century forward.9 It draws on memoirs, 
historical accounts, and theoretical analyses from multiple eras and conflicts, including 
                                                 
8 Julius Caesar, Seven Commentaries on the Gallic War, The World’s Classics (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 23–34. 
9 This thesis is not a comprehensive survey of German irregular warfare practitioners and theorists, but 
rather is limited to those predominantly accessible in the English language at this time. 
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the American Revolution, the Napoleonic Era, the World Wars, and the Cold War to 
identify German irregular warfare trends and strategic concepts. The thesis concludes 
with a summary of German irregular warfare strategic ideas of importance and 
recommendations for current and future application. 
C. GERMAN IRREGULAR WARRIORS SURVEYED  
This thesis will survey key German irregular warfare practitioners and 
theoreticians. In chronological and chapter order they are: Johann Ewald (1744–1813), 
Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck (1870–1964), Otto 
Skorzeny (1908–1975), Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte (1907–1994), Otto 
Heilbrunn (1906–1969). Each case is briefly introduced below. 
1. Johann Ewald (1744–1813) 
Hessian military officer, Johann Ewald, maintained a journal during his service 
under British contract in the American Revolution (1775–1783). This extensive journal, 
later published under the title Diary of the American War, served as a source for Ewald’s 
subsequent publication, Treatise on Partisan Warfare. Ewald’s appreciation for irregular 
tactics, writing talent, and first–hand experience in the “American War” make his books 
worthwhile and still relevant to students of irregular warfare. 
Before the “American War,” Ewald served in the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763), 
and later he closely observed much of the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815). His military 
experiences occurred during the end of the Age of Absolutism10 in Europe when, from a 
military perspective, cavalry were generally considered more valuable than light infantry, 
or what Ewald termed “jägers” from the German word for hunters. Not only did Ewald 
witness “American jägers” succeed against the British Army, but he also noted how 
Russian partisans picked away at Napoleon’s massive conventional army in 1812. The 
principles put forth by Ewald range from the tactical to strategic levels.  
                                                 
10 The Age of Absolutism refers to a period when absolute monarchs controlled much of Europe and is 
commonly considered to have ended with the French Revolution in 1789. 
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2. Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) 
Contrary to common perception, Carl von Clausewitz did contribute to irregular 
warfare strategic thought. In Book VI of his seminal work, On War, Clausewitz 
specifically addressed small wars, otherwise known as war of the people, insurgency, or 
partisan warfare. He described the conditions under which a people’s war can be effective 
and went on to discuss other aspects such as partisan and conventional force 
interdependence.11 Additionally, Clausewitz is known to have lectured on small wars in 
1811 and 1812 at the German Kriegs Universität. English translations of these lectures 
are currently pending; however, the primary translator, Christopher Daase, has published 
a paper in English summarizing their content.12 A closer look at Clausewitz’s writing and 
lectures is likely to identify principles beyond his comparatively familiar thoughts on 
conventional war and politics.  
3. Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck (1870–1964) 
Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck served as a General in the Imperial German Army 
on the African sub-continent prior to and during WWI.13 From 1914–1918, von Lettow 
led a local, German East African Askari force against the invading British. Although the 
British and their indigenous African troops enjoyed manpower and resource superiority, 
von Lettow orchestrated an ingenious irregular warfare campaign with strategic effects 
on the greater events of World War I. In addition to other accounts, von Lettow himself 
maintained a clear written record of his experiences in German East Africa. This memoir 
provides detailed first-hand accounts that include area assessments, tactical-to-strategic 
decision-making, event descriptions, and a mastery of the human domain, all in clear, 
concise prose. Von Lettow’s account, by itself, stands as a groundbreaking textbook for 
the student of irregular warfare. Other literature about his campaign will also be 
                                                 
11 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1976), 479–483.  
12 Christopher Daase, Clausewitz and Small Wars, Oxford University Conference “Clausewitz in the 
21st Century,” 21–23 March 2005. 
13 Von Lettow arrived in German East Africa as an Oberstleutnant [Lieutenant Colonel], and was later 
promoted. Byron Farwell, The Great War in Africa (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989), 
105. 
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examined, to include a parallel first-hand account from the senior British intelligence 
officer of the campaign, Major Richard Meinertzhagen. 
4. Otto Skorzeny (1908–1975) 
World War II Germany produced one of the most effective and feared irregular 
warriors of recent times. Best known for his leadership role in the rescue of Benito 
Mussolini, German Waffen-SS and Amt VI-S commander, Otto Skorzeny, perfected a 
cornerstone operation of irregular warfare—the strategic commando raid. In September 
of 1943, under direct orders from Adolf Hitler, Skorzeny successfully rescued Mussolini 
after the Italian leader had been overthrown and imprisoned by the Italian government, 
nearly resulting in the loss of Germany’s primary European ally. Skorzeny’s effort not 
only produced technical and tactical innovations, but also had important strategic impact 
for Germany’s greater war effort, namely national morale boost and resurrection of a key 
alliance. 
Commonly referred to as, “the most dangerous man in Europe,” Otto Skorzeny 
led multiple other irregular warfare operations.14 Most notably, he executed a kidnapping 
of the son of Hungarian leader Miklos Horthy de Nagybana and follow-on seizure of the 
Hungarian citadel; thereby forcing Hungary’s head of state to resign and ensuring the 
retention of Hungarian loyalty in the face of Soviet overtures for cooperation.15 Beyond 
the sheer magnitude of Skorzeny’s commando operations, however, is the importance of 
the study of the person himself; namely those unique characteristics that made him such 
an effective irregular warrior. 
5. Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte (1907–1994) 
Friedrich A.F. von der Heydte served as a German officer in World War II, after 
which he built a distinguished career in the German Bundeswehr. During World War II 
he served as a battalion commander in the German airborne invasion of Crete, the first-
                                                 
14Otto Skorzeny, My Commando Operations: The Memoirs of Hitler’s Most Daring Commando 
(Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1995), 452.  
15 William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice 
(Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995), 166. 
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ever divisional-size airborne invasion. Much of his later life was closely tied to academia, 
during which he published Modern Irregular Warfare: In Defense Policy and as a 
Military Phenomenon (1972). This book contributes significant ideas to irregular warfare 
in the Cold War era from someone competent in both irregular warfare practice and 
theory.16 
In an interview 14 years after the publishing of his book, von der Heydte provided 
some insight into his interest in irregular warfare and demonstrated how his writing from 
a decade earlier had increased in relevance based on events within Germany and the 
West. He explained that his ardent interest in irregular warfare partially stemmed from 
family ties, claiming a distant cousin served as a French officer at Dien Bien Phu, and a 
great uncle who helped the Austro–Hungarian Empire put down the Hungarian 
Revolution of 1848–49. He further addressed such topics as the American irregular 
warfare experience contrasted with the French irregular warfare experience in Vietnam, 
the history of Soviet and French partisan warfare, the inherent weaknesses of 
constitutional republics, terrorism (green or anti-nuclear/anti-industrial) and Soviet 
influence, and even the security of the apartheid regime in South Africa.17 Clearly, this 
military author and theoretician had much to offer in the realm of irregular warfare. 
6. Otto Heilbrunn (1906–1969) 
Otto Heilbrunn was a German author and military theorist who wrote in the wake 
of WWII with an eye on the future and an interest in applying lessons from the recent 
past. In their book, Communist Guerilla Warfare (1954), Heilbrunn and co-author C. A. 
Dixon described the tactics, organization, and doctrine of Soviet guerrilla groups that 
targeted the German military in WWII.18 This book also reviewed the German military’s 
counter-guerrilla strategy, focusing on the German Organization for Anti-partisan 
                                                 
16 Friedrich August Heydte, Modern Irregular Warfare: In Defense Policy and as a Military 
Phenomenon, 1st English ed. (New York, NY: New Benjamin Franklin House, 1986). 
17 Ibid., xiv–xxxiii.  
18 Aubrey Dixon and Otto Heilbrunn. Communist Guerilla Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
1954). 
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Warfare, its tactics, exploits, and a general assessment of effectiveness. The book 
concluded with a blueprint for future anti-guerrilla operations. 
Heilbrunn’s second book, Partisan Warfare (1962), was a comprehensive review 
of partisan strategy, operations, and tactics in light of multitude case studies.19 Russian 
partisan history remained of prime importance, but other examples such as Mao Tse-
Tung’s communist guerrilla war and the First Indochina War (1946–1954) received 
substantial attention as well. Heilbrunn spoke directly to the importance of coordination 
between partisans and the regular army, the role of air power in partisan war, partisan 
roles in nuclear war, and offensive anti-partisan operations 
Heilbrunn’s third book, Warfare in the Enemy’s Rear (1963), was a broader 
review of irregular warfare based on multiple case studies from around the world.20 
Topics addressed include partisan task and purpose, conventional force task and purpose 
when aligned with partisans, differences between rear and forward operations, and 
control structure within irregular units. Heilbrunn concluded with a chapter related to 
irregular warfare and the nuclear age and an appendix dedicated to the training notes of 
the famed English irregular warrior, Major General Orde Wingate. Heilbrunn also 
published numerous articles in English. 
The intent of this thesis is to identify what German strategic thought and practice, 
based on the surveyed cases, contribute to our understanding of irregular warfare. More 
specifically, this thesis will determine what these cases illuminate regarding German 
irregular warfare campaign strategy; what operational and intellectual trends exist within 
German strategic thought about irregular warfare; and the German track record with 
regard to irregular warfare. Is the German approach to irregular warfare unique? If so, 
how? Can German irregular warfare principles, lessons, or insights be applied to U.S. 
military education and/or strategy and how? Finally, what is the significance of German 
strategic thought about irregular warfare, and why has it been seemingly overlooked? The 
answers to these questions will be presented in the thesis conclusion.  
                                                 
19 Otto Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962). 
20 Otto Heilbrunn. Warfare in the Enemy’s Rear (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963).  
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II. JOHANN EWALD: DIARIST OF IRREGULAR WAR  
The first case study in this survey of German irregular warfare is rooted in 
American history. Captain Johann Ewald (Figure 1) was a Hessian officer who fought 
under British contract in the American Revolution (1776–1783).21 During this war, 
Ewald maintained a diary, later published under the title Diary of the American War: A 
Hessian Journal.22 Ewald’s diary spanned eight years (1776–1784) and contained 
detailed, first-hand accounts of his experiences as commander of a Hessian jäger 
company.23 In this capacity, he participated in every major battle, from White Plains, 
New York in October 1776, to the British surrender at Yorktown, Virginia in October 
1781, as well as in many smaller engagements of the American Revolution.24  
                                                 
21 “England did not have a sufficient army for the American War. . . . Of the estimated 29,867 German 
troops sent to America, 16,992 were from Hesse-Cassel, 5,723 from Brunswick, 2,422 from Hesse-Hanau, 
2,353 from Anspach-Bayreuth, 1,225 from Waldeck, and 1,152 from Anhalt-Zerbst. In the rebellious 
colonies all these German troops were indiscriminately termed ‘Hessians,’ just as all German immigrants 
were formerly called ‘Palatines.’” Joseph Tustin, “Preface and Introduction,” in Diary of the American 
War: A Hessian Journal, by Johann Ewald (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), xix. 
22 Three of four volumes of Ewald’s diary were only discovered by chance by an American military 
officer (Joseph Philips Tustin) on assignment in Germany in 1948. After a long but successful search for 
the fourth volume, Tustin published the entire diary in English in 1979. Joseph Tustin, “Preface and 
Introduction,” Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 
xiii-xvi. 
23 Jägers were Hessian elite troops, drawn from hunters and foresters for their shooting and tracking 
expertise. They conducted dismounted and mounted operations and were equipped with rifled guns as 
compared to the more common, and less accurate, smooth bore muskets of the time. Jägers also carried 
hunting swords for close combat, as opposed to bayonets. In contrast to the British Redcoats, Hessian 
jägers, “wore green coats with carmine collars, cuffs, and lapels, with green vests trimmed with gold.” 
Therefore, jägers more effectively blended in with their terrain than their “Redcoat” counterparts and were 
generally feared for their shooting accuracy and aggression. Jägers performed key tasks primarily in 
support of larger infantry and cavalry formations and operations. These tasks included: reconnaissance; 
reconnaissance security; ambuscades (ambushes); advance, rear, and flank guard; early warning; partisan 
operations; and raids. Joseph Tustin, “Preface and Introduction,” in Diary of the American War: A Hessian 
Journal, by Johann Ewald (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), xxi. 
24 Robert A. Selig and David Curtis Skaggs, “A Note on the Translation and Introductory Essay,” in 
Treatise on Partisan Warfare, by Johann Ewald, Contributions in Military Studies, no. 116 (New York: 
Greenwood Press), 1. 
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Figure 1.  Johann Ewald 
The value in Ewald’s diary is twofold. Not only did he personally bear witness to 
many watershed events of the war, but he also demonstrated objectivity in analysis and 
an understanding of the irregular warfare challenges at hand. Ewald’s insights into the 
principles of irregular warfare accompany other highpoints within the diary, including his 
perspective on General George Washington’s famous crossing of the Delaware River and 
victory at Trenton, New Jersey (1776); a second-hand account of the Wyoming Massacre 
(1778); an extensive description of the siege of Charleston (1780) from the British 
perspective; and a detailed description of the American siege on Yorktown (1781). He 
recounted various skirmishes, battles, and ambushes; and included critiques of British 
strategy and leadership; assessments of American tactics; personal letters from British 
Generals Sir William Howe and Charles Cornwallis to himself; his private thoughts on, 
and interactions with, Benedict Arnold; as well as a description of the American fort at 
West Point following the end of the war.25  
                                                 
25 According to Ewald, he wrote his diary notes each evening while others rested, thus ensuring a 
more accurate account of the day’s events. Johann Ewald, Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 3. 
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Shortly after his return to Europe, Ewald wrote and published a book titled 
Treatise on Partisan Warfare, largely based on his combat experiences in America.26 
Ewald’s treatise was designed to serve as a guide for the leader of a small infantry or 
combined infantry-cavalry unit. It prescribed tactics and principles for conducting 
operations in the American environment, and included recommendations for light 
infantry recruiting and equipment, patrolling, outpost selection, fortification occupation 
and defense, reconnaissance, ambushes, and retreats. Although the treatise shares many 
similarities with the U.S. Army Ranger Handbook, it also serves as an irregular warfare 
guide.27 Ewald’s diary and treatise, in combination, reveal important irregular warfare 
principles that remain applicable today. 
A. EWALD’S TREATISE IN CONTEXT 
The context of the time significantly shaped Ewald’s ideas on irregular war. 
During the Middle Ages (fifth to fifteenth centuries), the distinction between regular and 
irregular warfare was blurred in Europe, but by the end of the Thirty Years’ War (1618–
1648) the distinction had become stark.28 Monarchical, nation-state armies in eighteenth 
century Europe epitomized the extremes of conventional warfare, typified by a 
“professionalization” of the military.29 In an effort to ensure their own survival from 
internal and external threats, absolutist rulers built standing, conventional armies. While 
officers were recruited from the noble elites as a means to bind their loyalty to the state, 
soldiers generally came from the dregs of society and were pressed into service. This 
                                                 
26 Ewald’s primary goal for his publication was the education of his fellow officers. Of note, 25 years 
after its publication, Carl von Clausewitz, in his Vorlesungen über den Kleinen Krieg (1810–1811), still 
recommended the text to his students. Robert A. Selig and David Curtis Skaggs, “A Note on the 
Translation and Introductory Essay,” in Treatise on Partisan Warfare, by Johann Ewald, Contributions in 
Military Studies, no. 116 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 3. 
27 The U.S. Army Ranger Handbook, SH 21–76, is commonly recognized as the U.S. Army’s premier 
guide for light infantry patrol operations. Its legacy and content is traced back to lessons learned and 
documented by Major Robert Rogers, whose ranger unit fought for the British in North America during the 
French and Indian War (1754–1763).  
28 Max Boot, Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the 
Present, 1st ed. (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2013), 59. 
29 Ibid., 59–60. 
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resulted in expensive army formations that offered limited combat capability beyond 
organized fighting in open terrain.30  
Soon, partisan forces emerged in the contested regions of the European powers, 
such as the Austro–Hungarian and Russian empires.31 In their attempts to challenge the 
prevailing European powers, the partisans also revealed the susceptibility of the 
professional European armies to irregular threats. In response, states like Prussia and 
Austria established their own irregular forces capable of conducting “small war”-type 
operations, but the general opinion of irregular troops in Europe remained low. Because 
these troops were commonly considered bandits, little serious strategic thought was given 
to their unique, irregular warfare skill.32 
Across the Atlantic Ocean, an almost parallel rise in irregular warfare was taking 
place out of necessity—this one heavily influenced by frontier terrain and Native 
American fighting styles. During the French and Indian War (1754–1763) and other 
frontier conflicts, American colonists learned irregular warfare tactics that would transfer 
well when confronting the British army in the American Revolution. For the colonists, 
success in the “American War” depended on maintaining the psychological support of the 
people and forcing the British to wage war on the rebels’ terms.33 Colonists successfully 
blended the actions of regular light troops and those of the more irregular militias, and 
                                                 
30 Johann Ewald, Treatise on Partisan Warfare, Contributions in Military Studies, no. 116 (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1991), 9. 
31 “The ‘Military Dictionary’ attached to the second volume of the 1735 translation of Antoine de Pas, 
Marquis de Feuquieres, Memoirs Historical and Military, defined a partisan as ‘a Person who is very 
dexterous in commanding a Party, and knows the Country very well; he is employed in surprising the 
Enemy Convoys, or in getting Intelligence.’” Other definitions of partisan share certain characteristics such 
as political motivations, reconnaissance roles, and light troop composition. Examples of early partisan 
forces include the Pandurs and Cossacks from the area of southeastern Europe that is currently the Ukraine. 
Robert A. Selig and David Curtis Skaggs, “A Note on the Translation and Introductory Essay,” in Treatise 
on Partisan Warfare, by Johann Ewald, Contributions in Military Studies, no. 116 (New York: Greenwood 
Press), 5–12. 
32 Robert A. Selig and David Curtis Skaggs, “A Note on the Translation and Introductory Essay,” in 
Treatise on Partisan Warfare, by Johann Ewald, Contributions in Military Studies, no. 116 (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1991), 12–16. 
33 Robert A. Selig and David Curtis Skaggs, “A Note on the Translation and Introductory Essay,” in 
Treatise on Partisan Warfare, by Johann Ewald, Contributions in Military Studies, no. 116 (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1991), 23. 
 15
Ewald took note.34 His observations while in America and ideas on irregular warfare 
would prove accurate and prescient as he described in detail a type of warfare yet to be 
fully defined and/or appreciated. Even following British defeat in 1783, European leaders 
still refused to accept the lessons documented by Ewald.35 
B. APPLIED PRINCIPLES 
This chapter describes the irregular warfare principles that can be gleaned from 
Ewald’s diary and treatise. These are: adaptation; positive relations with the local 
population; discipline; initiative and opportunism; and respect for the enemy. Each 
principle will be explored through Ewald’s first-hand experiences and ideas. 
Ewald’s combat experience did not begin in America. Beginning in 1760, Ewald 
served in the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763), fighting with German troops against the 
French. Ewald was wounded in the knee by a musket ball in this war. Later, in 1770, 
Ewald lost his left eye as a result of a drunken duel. Following a long recovery, he 
attended school at the Collegium Carolinum, where he studied military science and 
economics and published his first military treatise, Gedanken eines hessishen Officiers 
über das, was man bey Führung eines Detaschements im Felde zu thun hat [Thoughts of 
a Hessian Officer About What He Has to Do When Leading a Detachment in the Field]. 
In 1774, then Captain Ewald began serving in the Liebjäger Corps, where he remained 
until beginning his contract as one of two jäger company commanders fighting for the 
British against the rebellious American colonists.36  
1. Fight Lean 
One of the primary reasons for Britain’s defeat by the American colonists, 
according to Ewald, “was that the British officer was not willing to adapt his way of life 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 24. 
35 Frederick the Great was one of many European leaders who neither appreciated irregular soldiers, 
nor the greater potential of irregular warfare. Robert A. Selig and David Curtis Skaggs, “A Note on the 
Translation and Introductory Essay,” in Treatise on Partisan Warfare, by Johann Ewald, Contributions in 
Military Studies, no. 116 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 28. 
36 Joseph Tustin, “Preface and Introduction,” in Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal, by 
Johann Ewald (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), xxv–xxvi. 
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or his style of fighting to the new environment.”37 Although the British army benefited 
from resource abundance, its excesses also hindered its operational success. On June 21, 
1781, Ewald expressed his disgust for these excesses, which included multiple African-
American slaves and horses assigned to officers down to the lowest levels, stating, “The 
Army appeared similar to a wandering Arabian or Tartar horde. . . . Any place this horde 
approached was eaten clean, like an acre invaded by a swarm of locusts. . . . I wondered 
as much about the indulgent character of Lord Cornwallis as I admired him for his 
military abilities.”38 British dependence upon luxuries during the war contrasted sharply 
with the Continental Army’s lack of resources, resulting in Ewald’s assessment that he 
“did not think there was an army in the world that could be maintained as cheaply as the 
American.”39 Ironically, the opposite stands true today. 
2. Blend In 
Unlike their British counterparts, Ewald’s jägers also adapted their dress to the 
wooded American environment. Instead of red coats, the jägers wore green coats and 
vests to better blend with their terrain—a common-sense decision grounded in their 
hunting heritage.40 Following battles, Ewald often surveyed enemy clothing, weaponry, 
and equipment in the interest of learning ways to improve those of his own unit. The 
jägers would even go so far as to adjust their uniforms to look similar to or even match 
those of their American enemies—an important feature of pseudo operations.41  
                                                 
37 Robert A. Selig and David Curtis Skaggs, “A Note on the Translation and Introductory Essay,” in 
Treatise on Partisan Warfare, by Johann Ewald, Contributions in Military Studies, no. 116 (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1991), 21. 
38 Johann Ewald, Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1979), 305–306. 
39 Ibid., 354. 
40 Joseph Tustin, “Preface and Introduction,” in Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal, by 
Johann Ewald (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), xxi. 
41 Johann Ewald, Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1979), 314. 
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3. Adapt Operations 
In his treatise, Ewald also recommended operational adaptations. These included 
operating as much as possible during the night as opposed to the day, ensuring maximum 
unit readiness during hours of darkness, and intimately learning the terrain around him.42 
Ewald also advised against allowing comfort to take precedence over security. For 
instance, when first occupying a post thought to be far from the enemy, Ewald warned, 
“One comforts himself with the thought, impermissible in war, that this [caution] is 
unnecessary here, this is a good post, the enemy is far away from us. Yet often these 
words have barely been spoken when the punishment for such carelessness is right 
there.”43  
4. Make Friends 
According to Ewald, the British also failed to adapt culturally. Although Lord 
Cornwallis promoted a sympathetic and population-centric approach in the American 
South, his subordinate leaders, such as Banastre Tarleton, notoriously terrorized the 
locals. Stories of rape, pillage, and plunder quickly spread and galvanized popular 
resistance against the British.44 Ewald, on the other hand, for reasons both genuine and 
practical, strove to establish good relations with the local population. He prioritized 
efforts to question locals, hear their grievances, and treat them fairly—actions that gained 
Ewald respect and tangible benefits as exemplified by the following statement, made to 
Ewald by a rebel sympathizer: 45  
My friend, I confess to you that I am a friend of the States and no friend of 
the English government, but you have rendered me a friendly turn. You 
have showed me that humanity which each soldier should not lose sight 
of. You have protected my property. I will show you that I am grateful. 
You stand in a corps which is hourly threatened by the danger of the first 
                                                 
42 Johann Ewald, Treatise on Partisan Warfare, Contributions in Military Studies, no. 116 (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1991), 75, 87, 88. 
43 Ibid., 81. 
44 Max Boot, Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the 
Present, 1st ed. (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2013), 71. 
45 Johann Ewald, Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1979), 119 and 217. 
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attack when the enemy approaches. Friend, God bless your person! The 
success of your arms I cannot wish.—Friend! General Washington has 
marched up to Norriton today!—Adieu! Adieu!46 
Conversely, Ewald also acknowledged the challenges related to the population 
that he faced, stating, “Since the entire countryside was devoted to him [Washington], no 
person except this honest man would let us know it. We could not learn much from our 
patrols because they were constantly betrayed by the country people and attacked, and 
did not dare to venture farther than they could get support.”47 
5. Use Locals 
In his treatise, Ewald emphasized the benefits of good relationships with the local 
population. In multiple chapters, he encouraged employing local guides and spies and 
maintaining frequent communication with prominent local village leaders.48 When 
patrolling, Ewald advised not to “simply pass villages and people, but send them to the 
patrol leader for questioning and spy potential.”49 In the defense of a town or 
fortification, Ewald recognized that locals could provide intelligence on secret passages, 
infiltration routes, and patterns of life.50 
Ewald also employed the local population for discreet early warning. In one 
example, he convinced a man, whose house could be seen from afar due to its prominent 
hilltop position, to hang clothes to dry from a point on the rooftop whenever “enemy 
parties were in the vicinity of his house.”51  Ewald’s trust in, and ability to leverage, this 
person to provide an outer layer of security enabled a decrease in his own unit’s security 
tasks, thus increasing its operational capacity. 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 92. Long afterward, Ewald would refrain from naming this informant when reciting this story, 
but said the man warned Ewald, “‘My friend, be on your guard tonight and tomorrow’” (Ibid., 395).  
47 Ibid., 93. 
48 Johann Ewald, Treatise on Partisan Warfare, Contributions in Military Studies, no. 116 (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1991), 76, 77, 85, 91–93. 
49 Ibid., 77. 
50 Ibid., 91–93. 
51 Johann Ewald, Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1979) 140–142. 
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6. Stay Sharp 
Ewald prioritized good order and discipline, particularly as it related to treatment 
of the local population. He described multiple instances in his diary of swift and effective 
discipline enforcement, and in Chapter Two of his treatise, Ewald stated, “Instill strict 
discipline, especially regarding treatment of the population.”52 As a warning to those who 
may dismiss his advice, Ewald explained:  
If you want to throw in the weak objection here that the soldier could also 
do a lot out of love for his officer, I will laugh at that and assure you that 
the love of a German soldier is nothing but a shadow and worth nothing if 
he is not kept in the strictest discipline, and that officer who is called a 
good officer by the soldier is certainly nothing more than what the French 
call a honnete homme [honest man].53  
Senior officers from both sides of the war recognized the discipline of the 
Hessians, as shown by General Washington’s statement: “One thing I must remark in 
favor of the Hessians, and that is, that our people who have been prisoners generally 
agree they received much kinder treatment from them than from British officers and 
soldiers.”54  
7. Attack 
Another principle that clearly emerges from Ewald’s writing is that attack is the 
best defense.55 Initiative and opportunism are at the heart of this statement and can be 
viewed on multiple levels. Ewald witnessed how the unrelenting use of ambush and 
surprise enabled the Americans to victimize and wear down a stronger British army. 
Specifically, he stated, “The Americans are very skillful in placing such small ambushes 
for their own safety in front of their outposts which has cost many an Englishman or 
                                                 
52 Johann Ewald, Treatise on Partisan Warfare, Contributions in Military Studies, no. 116 (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1991), 69. 
53 Ibid., 126–127. 
54 George Washington, The Writings of George Washington, edited by Jared Sparks, 12 vols. (Boston, 
1858), IV, 309. 
55 Robert A. Selig and David Curtis Skaggs, “A Note on the Translation and Introductory Essay,” in 
Treatise on Partisan Warfare, by Johann Ewald, Contributions in Military Studies, no. 116 (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1991), 22. 
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German his life or his freedom.”56 To counter this, Ewald proposed the execution of 
attack and ambush in different scenarios. When patrolling, he said, “If you must become 
engaged then attack first and hard, because he who attacks first has the victory already 
half in hands and fortune is usually on the side of the most decisive and courageous.”57 
Ewald also recommended employing hasty ambushes based on sudden intelligence of 
enemy approach or movement along a route.58 He later devoted a whole chapter in his 
treatise to ambushes, including baited ambush techniques.59  
8. Turn Defense Into Offense 
Ewald sought the initiative while on the defensive. According to Ewald, “In 
general, if the partisan is familiar with the area through which he retreats, and if, in 
addition, he has that kind of knowledge which such an officer has to have, he has to 
remain a danger to the enemy even in a retreat and can delay the pursuit by the enemy for 
days”60—this, says the jäger, can only occur if one understands his terrain.61 
9. Look for Opportunity 
Ewald also saw opportunity following the end of the war. In 1783, upon hearing 
the high levels of discontent with Congress among the local population in New York, 
Ewald commented, “if the English were willing to squander large sums of money among 
these people they could easily cause fresh unrest in this new state, by which it would be 
quite possible to turn a part of these provinces to the British side again.”62 Here, Ewald 
envisioned the employment of unconventional warfare before the term’s existence as a 
means through which to disrupt the new American state.  
                                                 
56 Johann Ewald, Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1979), 86. 
57 Johann Ewald, Treatise on Partisan Warfare, Contributions in Military Studies, no. 116 (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1991), 79. 
58 Ibid., 182. 
59 Ibid., 118–119. 
60 Ibid., 123. 
61 Ibid., 122. 
62 Johann Ewald, Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1979), 356. 
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10. Keep Your Enemies Close 
Ewald also emphasized that initiative can be had by maintaining proximity to 
one’s enemy. “Circumstances permitting, it is best to place one’s posts as close to the 
enemy as possible. A soldier who can see the enemy will be twice as much on his guard 
and does everything willingly, and if the enemy be careless at any given moment one can 
quickly deal him a blow,” according to Ewald.63 Thus, by virtue of proximity to the 
enemy, one retains a natural caution, initiative, and opportunity, all of which tend to 
decrease with distance. 
11. Never Underestimate 
Finally, Ewald consistently demonstrated a healthy respect for his foe—an 
important trait that is often overlooked, but tends to routinely occur when one force, in 
this case the British, enjoys resource, manpower, and/or technological advantages over its 
enemy. “On the whole, it is safe to say that never in this world was an army as well paid 
as this [British] one during the civil war in America,” said Ewald.64 Yet, time and again 
Ewald noted British shortcomings and American achievements. On December 29, 1776, 
Ewald expressed his frustration with British leadership’s underestimation of its American 
enemy, resulting in a failure to conduct adequate security patrols in the area of General 
Washington’s famous crossing of the Delaware River. Ewald concluded, “Thus the fate 
of entire kingdoms often depends upon a few blockheads and irresolute men.”65 And 
further, “On every occasion during this war, one can observe the thoughtlessness, 
negligence, and contempt of the English toward their foe.”66  
In reference to the Americans, Ewald observed:  
With what soldiers in the world could one do what was done by these 
men, who go about half naked and in the greatest privation? Deny the best 
                                                 
63 Johann Ewald, Treatise on Partisan Warfare, Contributions in Military Studies, no. 116 (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1991), 87. 
64 Johann Ewald, Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1979) 118. 
65 Ibid., 45. 
66 Ibid., 183. 
 22
disciplined soldiers of Europe what is due them and they will run away in 
droves, and the general will soon be alone. But from this one can perceive 
what an enthusiasm—which these poor fellows call ‘Liberty’—can do!.... 
Who would have thought a hundred years ago that out of this multitude of 
rabble would arise a people who could defy kings and enter into a close 
alliance with crowned heads?67 
Ewald also frequently admired the tactical expertise, toughness, and weapons of 
his irregular foes.68 In a counter-insurgency environment, the insurgent’s capability, will, 
and resourcefulness are commonly underestimated, but Ewald did not succumb to this 
trap—something that contributed to his battlefield successes. 
12. Keep Learning 
Ewald was a student of warfare. He demonstrated a keen interest in professional 
learning, reading, and improvement through experience, as clearly revealed in this 
December 2, 1776 diary passage:  
For the love of justice and in praise of this nation, I must admit that when 
we examined a haversack of the enemy, which contained only two shirts, 
we also found the most excellent military books translated into their 
language. For example, Turpin, Jenny, Grandmaison, La Croix, Tielke’s 
Field Engineer, and the Instructions of the great Frederick to his generals I 
have found more than one hundred times. Moreover, several among their 
officers had designed excellent small handbooks and distributed them in 
the army. Upon finding these books, I have exhorted our gentlemen many 
times to read and emulate these people, who only two years before were 
hunters, lawyers, physicians, clergymen, tradesmen, innkeepers, 
shoemakers, and tailors.69  
As a military professional, Ewald felt obligated to pass on the warfare lessons that 
he had learned. Nested in these lessons are the above described irregular warfare 
                                                 
67 Ibid., 340–341. Ewald reiterated, “I became totally lost in my meditations as I tried to imagine the 
American army in its wretched condition, such as we had often encountered it during the year 1776 and 
chased it from hill to hill. . .This, too, is a part of that ‘Liberty and Independence’ for which these poor 
fellows had to have their arms and legs smashed.—But to what cannot enthusiasm lead a people!” Johann 
Ewald, Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979) 354–
355.  
68 Ibid., 145, 340–341. And, Johann Ewald, Treatise on Partisan Warfare, Contributions in Military 
Studies, no. 116 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 86. 
69 Johann Ewald, Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1979), 108. 
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principles. Although many of the respected European military leaders of Ewald’s time 
did not appreciate the value of these principles, history has proved, and continues to 
prove, their worth. Ewald’s legacy as an early German irregular warfare practitioner and 
theorist was enduring. His irregular warfare principles reemerged in the writings of later 
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III. CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ 
It may be argued that Carl von Clausewitz (Figure 2) is the most preeminent 
military theorist of all time. A short review of his life reveals an impressive military and 
intellectual background, which formed the foundation of his written work. Clausewitz 
served in the Prussian Army as France evolved from revolutionary state into the most 
dominant land power on the European continent. Fueled by mass conscription and the 
skillful leadership of Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821), France’s increased military 
might was equally matched by its political and territorial ambitions.70  
 
Figure 2.  Carl von Clausewitz  
A. PERSONAL HISTORY 
All of Clausewitz’s military experiences occurred in the context of Prussian 
battles against France, with a brief stint as a staff officer in the Russian Army in 1812.71 
                                                 
70 Peter Paret, “The Genesis of On War,” in On War, by Carl von Clausewitz, Trans. Michael Howard 
and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 9–10. 
71 Ibid., 18. 
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Clausewitz first served in combat as a twelve-year-old lance corporal in 1793.72 From 
1801 to 1803, Clausewitz attended the Prussian War College where he began an 
influential relationship with his long-term mentor and senior Prussian army officer 
Gerhard von Scharnhorst (1755–1813).73 In 1806, Clausewitz again fought against 
France as an infantryman in a grenadier battalion before his unit was forced to 
surrender.74 As a Russian army staff officer in 1812, Clausewitz developed a plan to 
organize the East Prussian militia. Next, Clausewitz became chief of staff of a small 
international army that covered the Baltic flank of the Allies against French aggression. 
Soon thereafter, Clausewitz gained readmission to the Prussian service.75 In 1818, 
Clausewitz became Superintendent of the Prussian War Academy in Berlin. Much of his  
writing from this point forward would serve as the basis for his seminal book On War.76 
Shortly before his death in 1831, Clausewitz was transferred to the Prussian Army’s 
artillery inspectorate. Like many others at this time, it is believed that Clausewitz died of 
complications from cholera.77 
B. HISTORICAL INFLUENCES 
Clausewitz was a student of history. He valued the specific details of individual 
battles and campaigns over more general military historical knowledge.78 Clausewitz 
wrote increasingly and prolifically throughout his life on a range of subjects from the 
tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war to historical analyses. Ultimately, he is 
recognized for developing his own unique and comprehensive theory of war, as described 
in On War.79 Clausewitz’s writing was also heavily influenced by eighteenth and 
nineteenth century German and French philosophers, such as Immanuel Kant, Georg 
                                                 
72 Ibid., 5. 
73 Ibid., 8. 
74 Ibid., 13. 
75 Ibid., 18. 
76 Ibid., 19. 
77 Peter Paret, “The Genesis of On War,” in On War, by Carl von Clausewitz, Trans. Michael Howard 
and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 24. 
78 Ibid., 24. 
79 Ibid., 20.  
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Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brède et de 
Montesquieu.80  
Clausewitz is most often cited for his ideas on war and politics, especially that 
war is an extension of politics. The war of which Clausewitz wrote is commonly 
understood as regular combat representative of nineteenth and twentieth century 
Europe.81 Contrary to general opinion, Clausewitz also recognized and contributed 
important ideas to the understanding of irregular warfare. In Book VI, chapter XXVI of 
On War, Clausewitz addressed the topic of people’s war, which he inaccurately described 
as a phenomenon of the nineteenth century.82  
C. LESSONS FROM CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS 
Clausewitz’s ideas on irregular warfare were informed by key political-military 
events of his time. According to Clausewitz scholar and writer Christopher Daase, 
Clausewitz’s ideas sprang from his study of the rebellion in the Vendee (1793–1796), the 
                                                 
80 Ibid., 15. 
81 In this case, “regular” denotes military forces subordinate to a sovereign and internationally 
recognized state. Common uniforms, legal recognition, and adherence to European tactical standards of 
fighting characterized these forces. “Irregular” forces, on the other hand, fell outside of such 
characterizations and state subordination.  
82 Karl von Clausewitz, On War, Trans. O.J. Matthijs Jolles (New York: Random House, Inc., 1943), 
457. Book VI, Chapter XXVI, titled “Arming the Nation,” represents less than one percent of the entire 
book On War, so it is understandable that the casual reader and student of Clausewitz is often unaware of 
his ideas on irregular warfare. The term “people’s war,” in this case, describes specific types of irregular 
warfare, notably insurrection, resistance, and partisan operations. Of note, this edition of On War uses 
“Karl” instead of “Carl.” 
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Tyrolean uprising (1809), and the Spanish insurrection and Peninsula War (1808–
1814).83  
1. The French Insurrection 
Following the French Revolution (1789), France faced internal rebellions against 
newly institutionalized national policies. In the Vendee, local citizens took up arms in 
militia fashion against the French military.84 Their grievances included excessive 
religious restrictions and the imposition of mass conscription. Soon, French forces faced 
a full-scale guerrilla insurrection that required sharp violence, arguably even genocide, to 
eventually quell.85 
2. The Tyrolean Rebellion 
Approximately one decade later, the Tyrolean rebellion of 1809 occurred in the 
context of war between two state alliances—France and Bavaria, against Austria and 
England. The county of Tyrol, previously under Austrian rule, had come under French 
and then Bavarian rule in 1805 and 1806, respectively. Similar to events in the Vendee, 
Tyrolean citizens grew frustrated by the actions of their Bavarian rulers, specifically 
related to tax raises, religious restrictions, and conscription. Supported initially by the 
                                                 
83 Christopher Daase, “Clausewitz and Small Wars,” in Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century, ed. 
Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 182–183. In addition 
to On War, Clausewitz also addressed irregular warfare on other occasions—most prominently in a series 
of military lectures and in his Bekenntnisdenkschrift, or memorandum of confession. Although both have 
yet to be translated into English, a preview of their content is available. Clausewitz scholar and writer 
Christopher Daase penned a chapter titled “Clausewitz and Small Wars” in Strachen and Herberg-Rothe’s 
Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century. In this chapter, Daase challenges the notion that Clausewitz’s 
writing does not contribute to or address the subject of small wars, or irregular warfare. On the contrary, 
Daase argues that, “Carl von Clausewitz was one of the first theorists of wars of national liberation,” as 
exemplified by the content of Clausewitz’s “Lectures on Small War,” given at the Berliner Kriegsschule in 
1811–12. In Bekenntnisdenkschrift, Clausewitz promoted the employment of the Spanish model of guerrilla 
warfare for use in Germany as defense against Napoleonic France. Daase makes three important claims 
about Clausewitz in relation to irregular warfare. The first is that, “Clausewitz provides the means for a 
superior conceptualization of political violence that allows us to describe historical and recent changes of 
war, including the emergence of guerrilla warfare and terrorism.” Secondly, Daase claims, “[Clausewitz] 
offers theoretical insights into the dynamics of defence and offence which helps to explain why certain 
actors apply certain strategies and tactics.” Finally, Daase asserts, “Clausewitz allows us to reflect on the 
effects of war on both actors and structures and helps to explain why big states often lose small wars.” 
Christopher Daase, “Clausewitz and Small Wars,” in Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Hew 
Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 182–183.  
84 The Vendee is a western coastal region of France, south of the Loire River. 
85 Norman Davies, Europe: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 704–706. 
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Austrian government, Tyrolean men revolted and established an irregular partisan force. 
The Tyroleans won multiple battles against French and Bavarian troops before eventual 
being suppressed.86 
3. The Spanish Insurrection 
The Spanish insurrection also informed Clausewitz’s ideas on irregular warfare. 
In this case, a Spanish resistance movement to French rule began in Madrid, then quickly 
spread throughout Spain before eventually being suppressed.87 Notably, each of the 
above examples included partisan force success against larger, regular forces through the 
employment of guerrilla tactics. Each partisan force gained advantages based on their 
superior knowledge of the local terrain and population, as well as on their motivation and 
will.  
This chapter addresses Clausewitz’s ideas on irregular warfare as communicated 
in On War.88 Clausewitz began his discussion of people’s war, or resistance, at the broad, 
theoretical level. Thereafter, he prescribed characteristics, conditions, and guidance for 
                                                 
86 Martin Rink, “The Partisan’s Metamorphosis: From Freelance Military Entrepreneur to German 
Freedom Fighter, 1740 to 1815,” War in History 17 (2010): 21. 
87 “The [Spanish] guerrilla bands avoided open battle, specializing instead in ambushes, night raids, 
and surprise attacks on isolated outposts. They provoked the French into murderous, collective reprisals on 
civilians.” Norman Davies, Europe: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 736. 
88 On War was first published in 1832. It was not initially recognized by Clausewitz’s German 
contemporaries as the masterpiece that most view it as today. Michael Howard, “The Influence of 
Clausewitz,” in On War, by Carl von Clausewitz, Trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), 27. Clausewitz intended for the book to make a lasting impression for 
years to come, but he feared that it would be incorrectly interpreted. Ibid., 28. The great Prussian staff 
officer, Helmuth von Moltke, is credited with energizing a renewed interest in On War in the mid-
nineteenth century. Ibid., 29. By 1905, five German editions had already been published. Ibid., 31. A 
French translation was published as early as 1849. Ibid., 36. The first English translation appeared in 1874, 
by British Colonel J.J. Graham, however, the British generally failed to appreciate Clausewitz’s writing 
until after World War One. Ibid., 38. The original English edition was re-published in 1909, along with a 
truncated translation by T.M. Maguire. Ibid., 38. In 1933, a fourteenth German edition was published. Ibid., 
41. The first English translation published in the United States was in 1943, translated by O.J. Matthijs 
Jolles. Many people consider this English translation to be superior to Graham’s original English 
translation. It was not until the Korean War (1950–1953), however, that On War began to receive serious 
attention from American military officers. Ibid., 42. Another English version appeared in 1976, this one 
translated from German by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. The translations of Book VI, Chapter XXVI 
in the 1943 and 1976 English versions of On War are virtually identical in content, with only slight 
variance in word choice and sentence structure on occasion. Quotations used in this thesis chapter all derive 
from the 1943 On War translation due to this author’s preference. Neither Clausewitz’s 
Bekenntnisdenkschrift nor his Lectures on Small War have been translated to English at this time. 
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irregular warfare employment. Clausewitz’s discussion of irregular warfare is short, but 
insightful, containing many important principles. 
D. THEMES OF CLAUSEWITZ’S ON WAR 
Clausewitz made two assertions in On War regarding irregular warfare at the 
theoretical level.89 First, Clausewitz claimed that the accepted warfare model of his time 
was inadequate because it did not properly account for irregular warfare. Clausewitz 
recognized that many of his contemporaries viewed irregular warfare as either 
illegitimate or inadvisable. Aristocrats considered irregular warfare to be a “revolutionary 
means, a state of anarchy declared lawful, as dangerous to the social order at home as to 
the enemy; or on military grounds, believing that the result is not commensurate with the 
expenditure of force.”90 In short, irregular warfare was not an accepted practice.91  
1. Irregular Warfare as a Progressive Tactic 
Clausewitz believed that warfare had moved beyond the “limited military 
system,” or restrictive lens, through which his European counterparts viewed conflict. In 
describing his view of irregular warfare, Clausewitz stated, “the elemental violence of 
war has burst its old artificial barriers; as an expansion and strengthening.”92 The last part 
of this statement indicates that Clausewitz saw advanced capability and opportunity 
through the employment of irregular warfare, beyond simply what could be achieved 
through regular warfare. Like Johann Ewald before him, Clausewitz’s views on irregular 
warfare were progressive for his time.  
                                                 
89 It is clear from Clausewitz’s writing and contextual understanding that the irregular warfare of 
which he speaks, is that of insurgency or resistance movements. Therefore, the use of the term irregular 
warfare in this chapter specifically denotes those forms of irregular warfare. 
90 Karl von Clausewitz, On War, Trans. O.J. Matthijs Jolles (New York: Random House, Inc., 1943), 
457. 
91 The acceptability of irregular warfare is later revisited and expanded upon by German theorist 
Friedrich Freiherr von der Heydte in the twentieth century. 
92 Karl von Clausewitz, On War, Trans. O.J. Matthijs Jolles (New York: Random House, Inc., 1943), 
457. 
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2. Irregular Warfare as an Attainable State Goal 
Second, Clausewitz asserted that every state should maintain and be able to 
employ an irregular warfare capability. According to Clausewitz, “the nation which 
makes judicious use of this means [people’s war] will gain a proportionate superiority 
over those who despise its use.”93 Thus, Clausewitz believed that states should maintain 
the option to employ irregular warfare within their repertoire of political-military tools. 
This is reinforced by Clausewitz’s statement, “Therefore, we no longer ask: how much 
does the resistance which the whole nation in arms is capable of offering cost that nation? 
But: what is the influence which such resistance can have? What are its conditions and 
how is it to be used?”94 The second two questions imply opportunity to use and 
opportunity through use, of irregular warfare. Clearly, Clausewitz believed in irregular 
warfare as a viable and potentially beneficial option in war. 
E. CRITICAL ASPECTS OF IRREGULAR WARFARE 
Next, Clausewitz identified irregular warfare characteristics and conditions, and 
also provided employment guidance.  
1. Wide Distribution of Forces 
He argued that resistance must be widely distributed so as not to be vulnerable to 
great blows of concentrated action. The theater of war in a resistance should embrace a 
considerable extent of the country. Therefore, if the resistance is viewed as a fire, or 
smoldering flame, it is both hard to completely extinguish and also capable of appearing 
in multiple locations throughout the battlefield.95  
                                                 
93 Ibid., 457. 
94 Ibid., 457–458. 
95 Karl von Clausewitz, On War, Trans. O.J. Matthijs Jolles (New York: Random House, Inc., 1943), 
458. 
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2. Exploiting Terrain 
 Similarly, terrain matters. Clausewitz believed resistance must be “carried on in 
the interior of a country.”96 It is beneficial to the resistance if “the country is of a broken 
and inaccessible nature, either from being mountainous, or by reason of woods and 
marshes, or from the peculiar mode of cultivation in use.”97 Also, a more rural 
countryside environment favors the employment of irregular warfare. According to 
Clausewitz, the “scattered distribution of homesteads” and numerous, but poor, roads 
create challenging conditions for the quartering of regular troops.98 A resistance 
movement, on the other hand, benefits from rural terrain and society. The dispersion of 
houses and people make it hard to corral an irregular force, and in this environment, “the 
spirit of the resistance exists everywhere, but is nowhere tangible.”99 
3. Pursuing Patience as a Strategy  
Like space, Clausewitz also emphasized the importance of dispersion in time. He 
argued that resistance creates a tension that can only destroy the enemy over time; there 
are no knockout blows. In other words, the war is not decided by a single catastrophe. 
Tensions rise in some areas, and fall in others, but over time, the enemy is worn down 
and can be defeated.100 
4. Maintaining Alliances 
Clausewitz recommended against the independent employment of irregular 
warfare. Instead, he argued that, “we must imagine a people’s war always in combination 
with a war carried on by a regular army, and both carried on according to a plan 
embracing the operations of the whole.”101 This statement is indicative of a more 
                                                 
96 Ibid., 458. 
97 Ibid., 458. 
98 Ibid., 458. 
99 Ibid., 459. 
100 Ibid., 458. 
101 Karl von Clausewitz, On War, Trans. O.J. Matthijs Jolles (New York: Random House, Inc., 1943), 
458. 
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advanced view of irregular warfare. It may derive from Clausewitz’s understanding of 
colonial combined operations against the British in the American Revolution (1776–
1783).102  
5. Knowing Your Men 
Clausewitz believed that the necessary measures of irregular warfare required a 
certain type of people and national character. He said, “It must be admitted that a poor 
population accustomed to hard work and privation usually shows itself more vigorous 
and better suited to war.”103 Ewald similarly articulated this idea in his descriptions of, 
and praise for, the American insurgents that he encountered during the American 
Revolution, and it is known that Clausewitz not only read Ewald’s writings, but also 
recommended them to his own students. 
Clausewitz also provided guidance on the manning and employment of a 
resistance force:  
National levies and masses of armed peasants cannot and should not be 
employed against the main body of the enemy’s army, or even against any 
considerable forces; they must not attempt to crunch the core; they must 
only nibble at the surface and the edges. They should rise in the provinces 
situated at the sides of the theater of war, and in which the assailant does 
not appear in force, in order to draw these provinces entirely from his 
influence. Where there is as yet no enemy, there is no lack of courage to 
oppose him, and the mass of the neighboring population is gradually 
kindled at this example. Thus the fire spreads as it does in heather, and 
reaches at last that stretch of ground on which the aggressor is based; it 
seizes his lines of communication and preys upon the vital thread by 
which his existence is supported.104 
                                                 
102 For example, Nathanael Greene successfully combined regular and irregular force operations 
against the British, resulting in British General Charles Cornwallis eventually ceding what terrain he had 
gained in the American South. John Arquilla, “The Confederacy Could Have Won—Unconventionally: a 
Thought Experiment for Special Warriors,” Special Warfare, (Spring 2001): 10–13. Retrieved from 
http://business.highbeam.com/6217/article-1G1–78397581/confederacy-could-have-won-unconventionally-
thought. 
103 Karl von Clausewitz, On War, Trans. O.J. Matthijs Jolles (New York: Random House, Inc., 1943), 
458.  
104 Ibid., 459. 
 34
This statement reveals Clausewitz’s understanding of the path along which a 
resistance should proceed to victory. It is methodical and sequential, but lacks the explicit 
phased nature of theories such as Mao Tse Tung’s three-phase unconventional warfare 
model. Therefore, Clausewitz’s ideas may offer more employment flexibility. 
6. Achieving Vapor and Vagary  
Continuing to address resistance force employment, Clausewitz warned that 
armed peasants of a resistance should rarely be concentrated and employed in mass, for 
this detracts from their advantageous qualities. Clausewitz noted how peasants benefit 
from dispersion, stating, “Armed peasants, on the contrary, when scattered, disperse in all 
directions, for which no elaborate plan is required.”105 Therefore, “a people’s war, it 
should, like a kind of nebulous vapory essence, nowhere condense into a solid body; 
otherwise the enemy sends an adequate force against this core . . . on the other hand, it is 
necessary that this mist should gather at some points into denser masses and form 
threatening clouds from which now and again a formidable flash of lightning may burst 
forth.”106 Clausewitz elaborated, however, that the concentrated points of attack should 
be “chiefly on the flanks of the enemy’s theater of war,” and if possible, “supported by a 
small force of regular troops so as to give it the appearance of a regular force.”107 
Clausewitz later stated, “If, therefore, its combustible material is anywhere to be fanned 
into a considerable flame, it must be at remote points where it has air, and where it cannot 
be extinguished by one great blow.”108 
7. Recognizing Morale as Critical 
Finally, Clausewitz addressed motivation and morale as it relates to the enemy 
and to the resistance force. He stated that resistance attacks on the enemy have the 
                                                 
105 Karl von Clausewitz, On War, Trans. O.J. Matthijs Jolles (New York: Random House, Inc., 1943), 
459. 
106 Ibid., 459–460. 
107 Ibid., 460. 
108 Ibid., 461. 
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potential to “create a feeling of uneasiness and dread [within the enemy].”109 
Importantly, the morale of the resistance, according to Clausewitz, can and should be 
elevated through the employment of regular troops. Clausewitz stated, “ The easiest way 
for a general to produce this more effective form of national rising is to support the 
movement by small detachments sent from the army. Without such a support of a few 
regular troops as an encouragement, the inhabitants generally lack the impulse and the 
confidence to take up arms.”110 Therefore, the regular troops can viewed as an accelerant 
or spark for the resistance. Clausewitz does not specifically address a scenario in which a 
resistance force operates in isolation and the resulting effects on morale. 
8. Resisting the Temptation to Despondency  
Clausewitz cautioned the weaker of the two opponents in irregular warfare, in this 
case the resistance, against accepting defeat too quickly. He explained, “No state should 
believe its fate, that is, its entire existence, to be dependent upon one battle, no matter 
how decisive it may be.”111 Instead, Clausewitz promoted the option to “retreat in the 
interior of the country,” and the chance to seek external support from a different country 
or actor. He emphatically concluded that, “There is always time to die.”112 Clausewitz 
understood the disproportionately high levels of morale and fortitude required to be 
successful in irregular warfare. 
In closing, it is clear that Clausewitz saw value in irregular warfare during a time 
when many were reluctant to do so. He provided a vision as to the nature of irregular 
warfare; its characteristics; conditions; and manning and employment guidance. In 
hindsight, many of his ideas were clearly groundbreaking. Clausewitz was undoubtedly 
influenced by the writings of his fellow German-speaking predecessor, Johann Ewald. In 
similar fashion, Clausewitz’s writing would impact future German irregular warfare 
theorists.  
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IV. PAUL EMIL VON LETTOW-VORBECK 
At the turn of the twentieth century, European powers held substantial colonial 
territories in Africa. In east Africa alone, Germany, England, Portugal, France, and 
Belgium all possessed colonies. Imperial Germany’s premier colony was German East 
Africa (GEA), situated just south of the Horn of Africa in what is today Tanzania. 
Bounded by British territory to the north, British and Belgian territory to the west, 
Portuguese territory to the south, and the Indian Ocean to the east, GEA was “nearly 
twice the size of Germany and included terrain ranging from arid steppes to humid 
jungles and rugged mountains.”113 The colony’s interior offered the promise of a vast 
expanse of natural resources, accessible by two east-west running rail lines that 
originated at the port cities of Tanga and Dar es Salaam.114  
Great Britain was strategically stronger than Germany in East Africa. British East 
Africa (BEA), a colony which has since become Kenya, lay directly north of GEA. In 
addition to BEA, the British owned the island of Zanzibar off the coast of GEA, and the 
British Royal Navy commanded the waters of the Indian Ocean.115 Before World War I, 
“Great Britain relied on the Royal Navy and sea dominance for its imperial defense. A 
worldwide-system of undersea telegraph cables connected friendly territories to the 
British homeland and provided unparalleled strategic, secure communication.”116 This 
combination of a large, dispersed navy and effective global communication infrastructure 
allowed the British to secure trade routes, move troops, and reinforce territories within its 
massive empire, providing an important advantage over colonial rivals.  
                                                 
113 Ross Anderson, The Forgotten Front: The East African Campaign, 1914–1918 (Stroud, 
Gloucestershire: Tempus, 2004), 14. 
114 These “ …marvels of German engineering …brought western civilization inland; towns sprang up 
along their tracks and plantations were worked within hauling distance.” Byron Farwell, The Great War in 
Africa (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989), 110–111. 
115 Ibid., 19. Zanzibar (16km off the coast of GEA) served as a hub for British strategic 
communication cables. Because the Germans lacked their own equivalent system, they also relied on these 
cables, thus presenting a vulnerability in time of war.  
116 Ibid., 15. 
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Germany’s Indian Ocean naval presence was smaller than Great Britain’s and 
sought advantage in speed. Its premier cruiser, the SMS Königsberg, boasted ten 4.1-inch 
guns and a maximum speed of 24 knots.117 In the event of war, Germany would employ 
Kreuzerkrieg, or cruiser warfare, a strategy that utilized speed to attack British merchant 
ships while avoiding the stronger British warships—a kind of maritime guerrilla war.118 
The German ships were principally based at the GEA ports of Dar es Salaam and Tanga. 
Germany also maintained a naval presence on both Lake Victoria in northern GEA and 
Lake Tanganyika along its western border.  
In January 1914, then-43-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Paul Emil von Lettow-
Vorbeck (see Figure 3) arrived in GEA to take command of the colonial defense force 
known as the Schutztruppe.119 This force was led by German officers and non-
commissioned officers, and its ranks largely consisted of native Askari soldiers.120 Von 
Lettow boasted a strong resume, consisting of a traditional Prussian officer cadet 
academy education, General Staff experience, and Seebataillon (Marine) command. He 
had significant foreign-service stints, including service in the Boxer Rebellion in China in 
1900–1901 and in suppression of the Herero revolt in German South-West Africa in 
1904–1905.121 Von Lettow anticipated a conflict in Africa and considered it a strategic 
opportunity to support Germany’s war effort against the British. Beyond German cruiser 
operations in the Indian Ocean, von Lettow pondered, “The question was whether it was 
possible for us in our subsidiary theatre of war to exercise any influence on the great 
decision at home. Could we, with our small forces, prevent considerable numbers of the 
enemy from intervening in Europe, or in other important theatres, or inflict on our 
                                                 
117 Ibid., 20. 
118 Ibid., 16. 
119 The Schutztruppe consisted primarily of indigenous soldiers, referred to as Askari, and German 
colonial officers. The force was originally intended for internal policing, not for fighting major foreign 
powers. Hew Strachan, The First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 88. 
120 The word “Askari” simply means soldier in Swahili. It was commonly used in the east African 
region to describe almost any native soldier during the colonial period. 
121 Edwin Palmer Hoyt, Guerilla: Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck and Germany’s East African Empire 
(New York: Macmillan, 1981), 7. During the Boxer Rebellion, von Lettow, “was struck by ‘the clumsiness 
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enemies any loss of personnel or war material worth mentioning?”122 Von Lettow’s 
civilian authority was GEA Governor Dr. Heinrich Schnee. Schnee wanted more than 
anything to avoid colonial conflict, in order to preserve economic development and 
prevent an African uprising.123 World War I began on July 28, 1914, when Austro-
Hungary declared war on Serbia.  
 
Figure 3.  Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck 
                                                 
122 Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck, My Reminiscences of East Africa (London: Forgotten Books, 
2012), 3. 
123 Ross Anderson, The Forgotten Front: The East African Campaign, 1914–1918 (Stroud, 
Gloucestershire: Tempus, 2004), 36. The relationship between von Lettow and Schnee would remain 
contentious for the next four years. “As a Prussian of the old school,” Historian Eward Paice noted, “von 
Lettow-Vorbeck believed implicitly that the military was the First Estate, the buttress upon which the 
future of an embattled Fatherland rested.” Edward Paice, Tip and Run: The Untold Tragedy of the Great 
War in Africa (London: Phoenix, 2008), 18. 
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A. THE CAMPAIGN IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA 
On August 7, 1914, British ships shelled Dar es Salaam, thereby bringing World 
War I to east Africa.124 The attack destroyed a radio tower, but its primary target, the 
SMS Königsberg, remained elusive.125 With this outbreak of hostilities, Governor Schnee 
ordered the surrender of the colony. Von Lettow defiantly issued a contrary order: “I was 
taking over executive power, and that negotiations with the enemy must be conducted 
through me alone.”126 Von Lettow ordered the Schutztruppe and available partisan forces 
to engage the British along the GEA-BEA border. Von Lettow’s early direct 
engagements soon gave way to a four-year irregular warfare campaign, during which the 
Schutztruppe faced enemy pressure from all cardinal directions while suffering material 
and manpower disadvantages. Yet, von Lettow managed to attrite his enemy throughout 
and only surrendered after learning of Germany’s war capitulation four years later. This 
chapter describes von Lettow’s irregular campaign in five phases, as set out by the author 
for purposes of clarity and analysis.127 For visual reference, Figures 4 and 5 depict 
colonial Africa and German East Africa, respectively. 
                                                 
124 Edwin Palmer Hoyt, Guerilla: Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck and Germany’s East African Empire 
(New York: Macmillan, 1981), 19. By initiating conflict against German East Africa, Great Britain had 
technically violated Chapter III, Article 10 of the Berlin Act of 1885, which proclaimed European colonial 
neutrality in time of war on the European continent.  
125 Ibid., 19. 
126 Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck, My Reminiscences of East Africa (London: Forgotten Books, 
2012), 28. 
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Figure 4.  Colonial Africa in 1914    
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Figure 5.  German East Africa in 1914 
1. Phase I: Harassment 
Phase I (August 1914 to March 1916) began with the SMS Königsberg 
conducting hit-and-run attacks on British naval and shipping vessels in the Indian 
Ocean.128 Increased British naval attention and limited coal resupply soon restricted the 
Königsberg’s mobility, forcing the ship to seek refuge in the Rufiji River Delta (see 
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Figure 6).129 Once there, environmental obstacles unique to the delta blunted the British 
ability to destroy the cruiser until July 1915. At that point, her German crew abandoned 
and sunk the Königsberg using a torpedo warhead.130 But the Schutztruppe had managed 
to salvage all ten of the cruiser’s 4.1-inch naval guns for use in future land operations.131 
Phase I also included fighting on Lake Victoria and Lake Tanganyika, both of which the 




Figure 6.  The SMS Königsberg  
In the summer and fall of 1914, the Schutztruppe conducted harassing attacks 
against British targets on the Uganda rail line connecting Mombasa to Taveta. These 
netted limited material effects but important psychological results. The British 
Committee of Imperial Defence in London authorized an increase of four thousand Indian 
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troops to the East African theater amid fears of a larger German invasion, validating von 
Lettow’s plan to draw British resources to his location.132  
On November 2, 1914, the British executed an amphibious assault on Tanga using 
12,000 Imperial troops of the British Indian Army.133 This operation quickly proved to be 
a disaster for the British and an enormous success for von Lettow. Not only did von 
Lettow’s spy network inform him of the British intent to invade, but British leadership 
also found it necessary to announce their impending arrival.134 A frustrated British 
Intelligence Officer, Major Richard Meinertzhagen, noted, “To give the Germans twenty-
four hours’ advance warning of attacks seems criminal. And the Germans are such good 
soldiers that we can ill afford to give them a single advantage.”135 Furthermore, British 
General Aitken failed to conduct an adequate reconnaissance, partly due to over-
confidence based on his racial bias. Aitken predicted, “The Indian Army will make short 
work of a lot of niggers.”136 In the aftermath, however, Meinertzhagen assessed, “During 
the two days of fighting at Tanga we lost 800 killed and wounded. [Brigadier General and 
Brigade Commander] Tighe lost exactly 50 per cent of his officers…we did not capture a 
single German, either European or African.”137 
Von Lettow and the Schutztruppe also executed a well-prepared defense with 
their 3,000 men, resulting in an overwhelming victory.138 In post-Tanga prisoner 
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negotiations, Meinertzhagen noted that, “German machine guns were deadly and swept 
every approach, every house spitting fire … The German officers whom I met today were 
all hard looking, keen and fit and clearly knew their job and realised its seriousness.”139 
As a result, the Schutztruppe succeeded in capturing enough modern rifles to re-arm three 
Askari companies, of approximately 130 men each, as well as 600,000 rounds of 
ammunition, sixteen machine guns, valuable field telephones, and clothing to last the 
Schutztruppe for a year.140 More importantly, “The success at Tanga called forth and 
revived determination to resist [the British] all over the colony.”141  
Following victory at Tanga, von Lettow transitioned his main effort to the 
Kilimanjaro region of northern GEA—and area that offered a safe haven and a launching 
point for offensive operations. Throughout 1915, the Schutztruppe penetrated the BEA 
border and executed nearly fifty raids against the Uganda railroad.142 Through these 
sabotage and ambush operations, the Schutztruppe “developed a system of fighting 
patrols” and experimented with different types of mines and explosive devices to blow up 
British trains and track, but rarely remained to engage the British response forces.143 
According to von Lettow, “Our constant endeavor was to injure the enemy, force him to 
adopt protective measures, and thus to contain his forces here, in the district of the 
Uganda Railway.”144 The British responded by requesting thousands of South African 
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Boer reinforcements, establishing an alliance with the Boers that would last through the 
end of the war and beyond.145 
Phase I ended in the spring of 1916. At this time, the British and 30,000 newly 
arrived South African soldiers initiated an offensive operation against the 6,000-strong 
Schutztruppe in the Kilimanjaro region. Von Lettow assessed this to be an appropriate 
time for withdrawal from the area. His decision derived from already unacceptably high 
Schutztruppe casualty rates and an acknowledgement that, “In contrast to the great 
expenditure of ammunition by the hostile artillery, our light guns had to restrict 
themselves to taking advantage of specially favorable targets, not only because 
ammunition was scarce, but also because we had no shrapnel [rounds].”146 In moving the 
Schutztruppe south, von Lettow conceded the Usambara (Northern) Railroad while 
leaving a small rear guard to harass the enemy.147 Von Lettow timed his move with the 
arrival of the spring rains to further disrupt enemy pursuit. 
2. Phase II: Drawing the Enemy In 
In Phase II (March 1916–September 1916), von Lettow established an 
increasingly irregular defense in the colony’s interior, characterized by greater dispersion 
and delegation of operational decision-making authority, as well as smaller unit size.148 
The Schutztruppe’s new operations base, Kondoa-Irangi, lay along the Central Railway, 
connecting Dar es Salaam to Tabora. The strategy was not to defeat the British 
decisively, but rather to draw them deeper into the country using the Central Railway as 
bait. The British responded by flooding central GEA with additional British, Boer, 
Indian, and African troops, but their lengthening supply lines became easy targets for the 
                                                 
145 Ross Anderson, The Forgotten Front: The East African Campaign, 1914–1918 (Stroud, 
Gloucestershire: Tempus, 2004), 102–104. 
146 Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck, My Reminiscences of East Africa (London: Forgotten Books, 
2012), 104. 
147 Edwin Palmer Hoyt, Guerilla: Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck and Germany’s East African Empire 
(New York: Macmillan, 1981), 125. Note: The initial 10,000-man British pursuit element suffered 85% 
casualties as a result of environmental challenges and Schutztruppe rearguard actions. Ibid., 130. 
148 Ibid., 111–135. 
 47
mobile and acclimatized Schutztruppe. Soon, however, von Lettow felt pressured to 
adjust his strategy again, thus ending Phase II in September of 1916.149  
3. Phase III: Tightening Operations  
Von Lettow’s Phase III (September 1916–November 1917) strategic shift 
involved moving his force into the particularly rough Uluguru mountain region that 
facilitated defense, but offered limited local re-supply.150 This rugged area had 
previously served as a mountain retreat for German colonists, so von Lettow’s officers 
knew the terrain, enhancing their ability to conduct harassing operations within a larger 
regional defense. To ensure survival in this inhospitable environment, von Lettow 
thinned the Schutztruppe by sending non-essential personnel home and cutting porters to 
minimal levels.151 Simultaneously, von Lettow gave up defense of Lake Tanganyika in 
the West, which he had maintained to this point.152  
The British suffered heavy losses in their pursuit. They failed to fix the 
Schutztruppe and also faced brutally effective ambushes.153 These, combined with 
environmental factors, degraded the strength of the British. For example:  
The North Lancashire Regiment had arrived at Tanga in 1914 at 900 
personnel and was down to 345 to include replacements. The Twenty-fifth 
Fusiliers from South Africa—Boers—had come in at 1,200 strong and 
now numbered 200. The Ninth South African Infantry had started at 1,135 
and now numbered 120 men. Even a number of British staff officers had 
been forced out of country due to illness … The Indian soldiers suffered 
greatly from disease by this point, to include malaria, dysentery, 
pneumonia, black water fever, smallpox, the plague, typhus, typhoid, and 
meningitis … Of the British sixty thousand transport animals, more than 
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fifty-nine thousand had died, and their hundreds of imported motor 
vehicles and wagons were mostly non-mission capable.154 
From the Uluguru Mountains, the Schutztruppe moved to the southern Rufiji 
River Delta. This mosquito-infested environment offered another temporary location 
from which to fight while gradually moving further south. Depending on the fertility of 
the land, the Schutztruppe occasionally enjoyed nutritional sufficiency, but it mostly 
suffered from a lack thereof. Thus, resourcefulness and survival became paramount.155 
Meanwhile, the British believed that von Lettow could not sustain his native Askari 
support and that his force could be trapped against GEA’s southern border with 
Portuguese East Africa.156  
In October 1917, the British closed in on the Schutztruppe main body. Von 
Lettow engaged them. He credited knowing “the personality of the enemy commander 
[General Beves]” with allowing him to determine the proper strategy to win.157 Based on 
a previous engagement at Reata, von Lettow assessed that Beves’ aggressive personality 
would prompt him to order repeated frontal assaults—a prediction that proved correct.158 
According to von Lettow, “On the evening of October 18th we had, with some 1,500 
men, completely defeated a whole enemy detachment at least 4,000, and probably not 
less than 6,000 strong. With the exception of Tanga, it was the most serious defeat he had 
suffered.”159 After years of fighting on the run, living off the land, and facing a well-
reinforced enemy, the Schutztruppe clearly still posed a formidable challenge. In the fall 
of 1917, Phase III concluded in the southeast corner of GEA, at which point von Lettow 
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sought a new strategic move and the British prepared for what they thought would be 
victory. 
4. Phase IV: Madness as a Method 
Von Lettow initiated Phase IV (November 1917–July 1918) with a surprise cross-
border withdrawal that caught the British off-guard. In November 1917, the Schutztruppe 
marched south into Portuguese East Africa to evade pressure and to reconstitute.160 
Before departing, von Lettow assessed his situation and concluded it necessary to further 
reduce his force to increase mobility and speed. He allowed sick and wounded personnel 
to be taken prisoner by the British, producing a humanitarian burden for his enemy.161 
During the following nine months, the Schutztruppe conducted dozens of raids 
against Portuguese military camps, depots, and even villages. Portuguese defenses proved 
ineffective, which enabled the Schutztruppe to regain its strength by capturing weapons 
and ammunition. Von Lettow also used this opportunity to re-hone the tactical 
proficiency and battlefield discipline of the Schutztruppe, which had eroded after lengthy 
campaigning.162  
In the spring of 1918, von Lettow again split his force into three elements to 
account for less fertile land for food supply and to continue to frustrate the British pursuit 
elements.163 The Schutztruppe’s evasive maneuvers benefitted from the rugged terrain 
and receptive indigenous population, who viewed the Schutztruppe as a welcome 
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alternative to the callousness of the ruling Portuguese.164 In contrast, the British suffered 
enormously. According to one report, they buried 26,000 porters in PEA alone.165 The 
difference in losses between the British and German sides at this point could be attributed 
to von Lettow’s decision to thin his force and the Schutztruppe’s advanced survival skills 
and mobility. 
5. Phase V: Confusing the British  
By July 1918, the Schutztruppe was arguably one of the most self-sufficient 
guerrilla forces in the history of modern warfare. For nine months it had survived off the 
land and captured enemy supplies, while managing to retrain, rebuild, and re-equip 
itself.166 Von Lettow began Phase V (July 1918–November 1918) by leading the 
Schutztruppe back north into GEA, skirting the east side of Lake Nyasa. He employed 
three columns for this maneuver, intending to protect the middle column with two flank 
columns while running a gauntlet of larger British formations attempting to trap the 
Schutztruppe. Before the British realized it, the Schutztruppe had slipped past them. 
According to von Lettow, “The men were well armed, equipped and fed, and the strategic 
situation at the moment was more favorable than it had been in a long time.”167 However, 
his force was suffering from cumulative exhaustion. For almost two months, the 
Schutztruppe had averaged over 28 km per day with only three days’ rest. Rather than 
continuing north toward Tabora—a move the British expected—von Lettow instead led 
the Schutztruppe southwest into Northern Rhodesia, where softer targets could be 
exploited prior to returning to GEA.168  
On November 11, 1918, however, von Lettow received word that Germany had 
signed the Armistice and his Schutztruppe was to surrender. Once confirmed, the newly 
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promoted General von Lettow-Vorbeck and his loyal officers did just that.169 This 
concluded the Great War in German East Africa. 
B. LESSONS LEARNED  
Important lessons for the practical application to irregular warfare can be drawn 
from von Lettow’s four-year campaign.  
1. Adapt to Survive 
First and foremost in von Lettow’s success was his ability to adapt strategically to 
ensure Schutztruppe survival and enemy attrition. In his memoirs, von Lettow 
summarized his operational conditions: “I ask the reader to imagine himself in the 
position of a Commander, with insufficient means, exposed to attack by superior 
numbers, who has continually to ask himself: what must I do in order to retain freedom of 
movement and hope?”170 Von Lettow’s timely and thoughtful decision-making 
consistently enabled his force to achieve lopsided results while retaining the initiative.  
2. Economize  
The Schutztruppe enjoyed early success in direct engagements, such as at Tanga, 
but following a later battle near Kilimanjaro, von Lettow determined that although 
successful, “such heavy losses as we also had suffered could only be borne in exceptional 
cases. We had to economize our forces in order to last out a long war … to restrict myself 
to guerilla warfare, was evidently imperative.”171 His subsequent adaptation involved 
withdrawing the Schutztruppe towards GEA’s interior, and once there, re-organizing it 
into smaller, more autonomous elements capable of mobile defensive operations. Von 
Lettow assessed that this area, known as the Mahenge Country, would support his long-
term plan: “By moving there we should avoid being surrounded, it was fertile, and 
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suitable for guerilla warfare. From there also it would be possible to withdraw further to 
the south and to continue the war for a long time to come.”172 
This move presented South African General Jan Smuts a risky but enticing 
objective.173 Smuts’ senior intelligence officer, Major Meinertzhagen, cautioned in his 
diary: 
He [Smuts] is irresistibly drawn towards von Lettow and if he persists he 
will lose the initiative and the campaign will end in simply following von 
Lettow about wherever he chooses to wander. He is more mobile than we 
are and is operating in his own country. But we have vastly superior forces 
and should force the pace and dictate operations, making him fight us 
where we will and not where he wishes.174 
Smuts indeed pursued von Lettow, and in short order, deployed increasingly large 
numbers of troops into central GEA. The British utilized the Central Railway as their 
primary line of communication, but like the Uganda Railway, this too became a frequent 
target of the Schutztruppe and a liability. 
3. Withdraw and Recuperate 
Von Lettow’s biggest irregular warfare adaptation involved his decision to move 
his force into PEA to seek refuge. This creative solution enabled the Schutztruppe to 
escape increasing British pressure, overwhelm weaker Portuguese opponents, and capture 
substantial amounts of food, weapons, ammunition, and much needed medical supplies 
like quinine. Ultimately, von Lettow’s decision to move south across a colonial border re-
energized the Schutztruppe, facilitating its eventual move back north into German East 
Africa.  
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4. Memorize the Terrain 
Von Lettow drove environmental adaptations. During previous combat experience 
in South-West Africa, von Lettow had learned the value of local knowledge of the land 
and fieldcraft skills to fight in the African bush. Von Lettow did everything in his power 
to reconnoiter the countryside and utilize the environment to the Schutztruppe’s 
advantage. In his memoirs, von Lettow described his personal reconnaissance of terrain 
and enemy positions both on foot and using his bicycle, nearly resulting in his death 
several times, but also guaranteeing tactical advantages over the British. Major 
Meinertzhagen noted, “von Lettow is slippery and is not going to be caught by maneuver. 
He knows the country better than we do. “175  
Upon arriving in GEA in January 1914, von Lettow initiated an aggressive force 
assessment schedule, including visits to every outpost of his fourteen military companies. 
This enabled his understanding of the terrain and an opportunity to connect with a 
network of German colonial families. Throughout his travels, von Lettow noted both 
defensive and offensive possibilities. He also identified equipment shortcomings that 
affected his force. For example, the Askaris were primarily outfitted with the Franco–
Prussian War -era Model 1871 Mauser single-shot rifle, which emitted a cloud of black 
smoke upon firing. This obstructed the firer’s view and signaled his position to the 
enemy.176 Von Lettow repeatedly seized and sustained the initiative to overcome such 
disadvantages through the end of the campaign, at which point they had finally captured 
enough modern rifles from the Portuguese to completely discard the more antiquated 
Model 1871 Mausers.177 
5. Lead from the Front 
Von Lettow also lived, fought, and suffered with his troops in the field. He 
preferred to lead from the front. Even at the end of the conflict, the Askaris under his 
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command remained fiercely loyal to von Lettow, accustomed to his hard discipline, and 
respectful of a man who never asked of his troops what he would not do himself—an 
impressive feat considering his age of 44 at the start of the war.178 For his dedication, von 
Lettow also suffered. Over the course of the campaign, he received a mortar-shrapnel 
wound; was nearly shot on multiple occasions; temporarily lost his eyesight; and 
experienced recurrent malarial symptoms, foot infections, and general lack of nutrition 
and sleep.  
6. Go Small 
Von Lettow’s early, more conventional strategy required an enormous number of 
porters to carry food, water, and equipment. When moving on rail, “a company of 
150 Askaris, their 150 porters, plus machine guns, rifles, and packs, filled 7 carriages of a 
train.”179 Depending on the season and terrain, water and food could also prove 
challenging. Von Lettow overcame these challenges by not only thinning his force, but 
also dispersing and then re-consolidating it, depending on what the environment dictated. 
7. Remember Nature  
Von Lettow also used the environment against his adversaries. In 1916, he timed 
his southern withdrawal to occur just prior to the annual spring rains. The rains slowed 
the British pursuit while the disease-bearing tsetse fly wreaked havoc on British soldiers, 
horses, and pack animals.180 The Schutztruppe also dressed for the environment, wearing 
high-necked uniforms, long-sleeved shirts, and puttees, whereas the British exposed more 
of their skin to mosquito attack by wearing shorts and long stockings.181 As a result, the 
British suffered higher rates of typhus, malaria, and dysentery. 
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8. Simulate Ubiquity 
Von Lettow also forced resource adaptations in the Schutztruppe. In early 1916, 
when it became clear that the Königsberg no longer possessed any offensive capability, 
von Lettow ordered it be stripped of all serviceable weapons and equipment. This 
included ten 4.1-inch guns, to be distributed throughout the country for land defense.182 
Von Lettow initially assigned five guns to the defense of Dar es Salaam, two to Tanga, 
two to Lake Tanganyika, and one to Lake Victoria. They provided an important indirect 
fire capability, used most effectively in preplanned ambush and defensive positions.183 
Often, one or two guns fired in such a manner as to deceive the British into believing 
many more of them existed. This involved firing from one position and quickly 
displacing to another, as well as stoking hilltop fires at night to misrepresent dummy 
firing positions. Von Lettow also reassigned the entire crew of the Königsberg to the 
Schutztruppe, a total of 24 naval officers and 559 noncommissioned officers and enlisted 
men.184 These personnel initially joined the defense of Lakes Tanganyika and Victoria 
before being incorporated into the Schutztruppe ground defense.  
9. Maximize Available Weapons Technology 
The Schutztruppe also fabricated wooden frames to enable quick movement of its 
Maxim machine guns to the front of formations and to alternate fighting positions 
consistent with von Lettow’s mobile defensive plans. The Schutztruppe chose ambush 
and fighting positions based on fields of fire, helping to maximize the guns’ effect. In 
contrast, the British strapped their Vickers machine guns to mules during movement, 
increasing the time it took to put the guns into action.185 Major Meinertzhagen lamented 
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his force’s poor employment techniques, saying, “The handling of our machine guns is 
appalling. Our officers do not seem to understand their use or their power.”186  
10. Protect Morale 
Finally, in late 1917 and early 1918, von Lettow adapted his maneuvers to 
account for a British psychological warfare operation. British leaflet drops targeted native 
civilian populations in an attempt to drive a wedge between them and von Lettow’s 
Askari soldiers, many of who relied on local support and resupply. To counteract 
potential negative effects on the morale of his Askaris, von Lettow kept his columns on 
the move and conducted raiding operations to seize loot and motivate his men. By March 
of 1918, the Schutztruppe had crisscrossed 2,500 miles of terrain in PEA and showed the 
expected physical and emotional signs of wear, but morale had never dropped below any 
critical threshold.187  
C. THE IMPORTANCE OF PEOPLE  
In addition to adaptation, von Lettow also expertly leveraged multiple networks 
within GEA, to include German colonists, the GEA indigenous population, and his 
Askari soldiers.188 The Schutztruppe commander and his German officers established a 
mutual trust and shared identity with these groups, allowing them to capitalize on their 
knowledge of the terrain, access to resources, etc. One example is von Lettow’s 
employment of Captain Tom von Prince, a fiercely patriotic, retired German officer with 
previous irregular fighting experience throughout Africa. Von Lettow knew von Prince 
from the military, and he quickly reconnected with him upon arriving in GEA. At the 
time, von Prince offered his support to von Lettow in the event of a British attack. When 
the British attacked, von Prince employed his loyal volunteer network of Africans and 
Germans against British targets in the Kilimanjaro region. Specifically, von Lettow 
ordered von Prince to, “‘Destroy stations and railway lines. Cut telegraph wires; confuse 
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the enemy.’” On August 15, 1914, Von Prince’s successful attack on Taveta, a small 
town on a spur line of the Uganda Railway, served as the first GEA ground attacks 
against the British.189 
Much of the German colonial population resented Governor Schnee’s 
unwillingness to militarily defend the colony, and supported von Lettow instead.190 This 
support manifested itself in a variety of ways, including providing equipment and 
medicine to his Schutztruppe. According to von Lettow, “[W]hite and black women took 
to spinning by hand … suitable dye was obtained, which imparted a brownish-yellow 
colour, very inconspicuous both in the grass and in the bush, and therefore specially 
suitable for uniforms.”191 Existing factories also re-focused to support the war effort, and 
the Amani Biological Institute in Usambara began mass-producing quinine tablets from 
tree bark to support malaria treatment.192 The accrual of these small acts created 
momentum and filled resource gaps for the Schutztruppe. 
In another example of network management, von Lettow deliberately slowed the 
movement of his force in their retreat from central GEA to southern GEA in order to 
reinforce relations with the local native population. Von Lettow’s Schutztruppe still 
numbered approximately ten thousand Askaris, many of whom served as porters for the 
actual combat troops. Due to the Schutztruppe’s gradual loss of terrain, the influx of 
British troops, and British propaganda, some of the German East African native 
population, under pressure, had begun to side with the British. Von Lettow planned on 
retaking surrendered territory in the future and also required further indigenous support to 
supply his force and counter the British, so he proactively lobbied throughout the region 
to retain support prior to his withdrawal south.193 
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Von Lettow and his German officers expertly motivated their indigenous Askari 
soldiers by instilling a sense of pride and esprit d’corps among them. Von Lettow 
observed, “It was not personal ambition to which we appealed; we sought to arouse and 
maintain a real sense of duty dictated by patriotism, and an ever growing feeling of 
comradeship… this lasting and pure motive remained unsoiled by any other purpose that 
inspired Europeans and Askari with that endurance and energy which the Protective 
Force [Schutztruppe] manifested until the end.”194 Even von Lettow’s enemy recognized 
the impact of this, as evidenced by Major Meinertzhagen’s statement, “We all under-
estimated the fighting qualities of the German native troops... it speaks highly of German 
training and discipline... von Lettow has every cause for congratulations under harder 
conditions than we have experienced.”195 
Finally, von Lettow’s irregular warfare feats required a certain maverick character 
trait—a combination of stubbornness, determination, and perseverance. Von Lettow 
understood that, “the supreme power in the Colony was in the hands of the Governor.”196 
But, when Schnee ordered non-resistance, von Lettow, of course, attacked—and never 
stopped for the next four years. 
Von Lettow acknowledged in his memoirs that, “Since the outbreak of war our 
communication with the outside world had been to all intents and purposes cut of”197 
Therefore, in essence, von Lettow operated in a complete policy–strategy guidance 
vacuum. Throughout, von Lettow never waivered from his personal philosophy: “to gain 
all we must risk all.”198 This required courage displayed in many forms, including 
defiance of his immediate senior political leadership, attacks across two colonial-state 
borders, a commitment to irregular warfare for an unknown amount of time, and an 
acceptance of himself and his men as East Africans while maintaining their, “Teutonic 
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sense of loyalty peculiar to us Germans,” in the absence of explicit communications from 
their Fatherland.199  
In conclusion, this peripheral conflict of World War I presents a well-documented 
and practical example of irregular warfare application. By dissecting the Schutztruppe’s 
four-year irregular warfare campaign and studying von Lettow himself, it becomes 
apparent that his adaptability, network management skills, and special character traits all 
contributed to the Schutztruppe’s success against the British. Von Lettow’s enduring 
presence throughout the conflict contrasts sharply with the British, who changed field 
commanders six times. Certainly, von Lettow offers a model for irregular warfare 
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V. OTTO SKORZENY 
Otto Skorzeny was one of the most intriguing characters of World War II—a 
commando extraordinaire dubbed “the most dangerous man in Europe” (Figure 7).201 
Skorzeny’s military resume included combat on Germany’s western and eastern fronts 
and key roles in strategic irregular warfare operations. In particular, Operations Oak, the 
rescue of Benito Mussolini, and Panzerfaust, the Horthy affair in Hungary, contributed to 
German national war aims and helped establish Skorzeny’s legendary commando status. 
This chapter evaluates Skorzeny as a German irregular warfare practitioner by examining 
these cases and Skorzeny the man. Skorzeny proved that small, well-planned commando 
actions could achieve disproportionately high strategic results.202 This, combined with 
his insightful observations, reveals a uniqueness perhaps best summarized by Skorzeny 
himself: “Like it or not, a new type of soldier has arisen: an organized adventurer. He 
must have some of the qualities of a guerrilla, a man of science and an inventor, of a 
scholar and psychologist.”203 Skorzeny’s, My Commando Operations: The Memoirs of 
Hitler’s Most Daring Commando, serves as a primary source for the chapter.204 
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Figure 7.  Otto Skorzeny  
A. BACKGROUND AND EARLY CAREER 
Skorzeny’s youth informed his career as a soldier and irregular warfare 
commando. Like Adolf Hitler, Skorzeny was born an Austrian, but identified as 
German.205 In 1938, at the age of 30, Skorzeny rejoiced when the National-Socialist 
German Workers Party (NSDAP) won a plebiscite in Austria, which established an 
official union with Germany.206 A loss would have meant victory for Soviet-backed 
communists, which Skorzeny viewed as Europe’s greatest threat. While earning an 
engineering degree in Vienna, Skorzeny participated in sport dueling, which he believed 
served “to teach courage, coolness and will”—traits he would later rely on.207 Skorzeny’s 
ideological drive and physical prowess both aided his future military career.  
                                                 
205 Otto Skorzeny, My Commando Operations: The Memoirs of Hitler’s Most Daring Commando 
(Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1995), 12–13. 
206 Ibid., 31. 
207 Ibid., 13. It was during a duel that Skorzeny received his ever-recognizable facial scar, resulting in 
the nickname “scar face.”  
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In 1939, at the age of 31, too old for the Luftwaffe, Skorzeny joined the Waffen-
SS as an engineer officer. Although organizationally separate from the Wehrmacht, the 
Waffen-SS was frequently subordinate to it during operations. Waffen-SS soldiers were 
known for higher standards of discipline, physicality, and performance than their army 
brethren, and according to Skorzeny, trust, comradeship, mutual respect, and freedom of 
conscience characterized this all-volunteer unit.208  
Two occurrences in Skorzeny’s early military career proved influential to his later 
irregular warfare success. After serving in France, Skorzeny saw his first combat action 
in the Balkans in April 1941.209 While there on patrol, Skorzeny’s small force 
encountered a larger Yugoslav unit. Rather than engage in a firefight, however, Skorzeny 
showed restraint and in doing so, captured five enemy officers and over sixty soldiers.210 
He read the situation and realized violence was unnecessary to obtain their surrender.  
Next, Skorzeny fought in support of General Heinz Guderian’s Second Panzer 
Group in Operation Barbarossa, Germany’s surprise invasion of the Soviet Union.211 
                                                 
208 Ibid., 37. The Waffen-SS began as a small, elite bodyguard unit for Adolf Hitler. Recruited from 
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George H. Stein, The Waffen SS: Hitler’s Elite Guard at War, 1939–1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1966), 286–288. The author acknowledges that historical facts often point to the Waffen-SS 
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209 Ibid., 57–62. 
210 Ibid., 60. 
211 Ibid., 106. In August 1941, Skorzeny was decorated with the Iron Cross, Second Class following 
his artillery unit’s success against Russian enemies. Otto Skorzeny, My Commando Operations: The 
Memoirs of Hitler’s Most Daring Commando (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1995), 106.  
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After four months, Skorzeny was sent home with a shrapnel injury, but not before taking 
note of Russian partisan activity.212 Skorzeny observed, “As in Napoleon’s time our large 
formations were harried on their flanks or from behind by special counteroffensives and 
partisan units, which were impossible to find in the immensity of the land.”213 As a future 
special unit commander, Skorzeny would employ his own partisan forces while carrying 
out guerrilla operations on the Danube River in Hungary and Romania later in the war.214 
B. ADVANCEMENT  
Following his recovery and additional tours of duty in the Netherlands and 
Russia, Skorzeny’s career advanced quickly. In April 1943, due to his unique attributes 
and early battlefield accomplishments, as well as an old connection, Skorzeny was named 
as the Hauptsturmführer and commander of the Friedenthal Special Duties Battalion and 
the “Seehof” School.215 Skorzeny’s role was to be both unit organizer and commander, 
providing him an opportunity to test his “unorthodox ideas for a more daring war.”216 
Initially, Special Duties Unit Friedenthal consisted of 300 men, 85 percent of whom were 
German and 15 percent Dutch, Flemish, or Hungarian “ethnic-Germans.” All had 
volunteered from the Waffen-SS.217 The Sonderverband z.b.V. Friedenthal, as it became 
known, was designated for special employment, “meaning that any chief of an element of 
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the armed forces could call on them for special military operations.”218 But, according to 
Skorzeny, “from July 1943 I always received my orders directly from the OKW 
[Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or Supreme Command of the Armed Forces], or from 
Hitler personally.”219 
In his new role, Skorzeny planned and/or executed a number of irregular warfare 
operations. Two in particular, deserve close attention. Operation Oak entailed a tactically 
innovative and strategically important rescue operation. It is best understood with a brief 
background examination.  
C. OPERATION OAK 
Up until July 1943, Italy, under the leadership of Benito Mussolini, had been 
Germany’s prime wartime European ally. Unlike the Germans, however, Italy had not 
fared so well militarily. Skorzeny elaborated:  
From 1940 the poorly equipped, inadequately fed and badly led Italian 
troops went from one catastrophe to the next, in Ethiopia, on the French 
border, in Greece, in Albania, in Cyrenaica, in Libya, Somaliland, Eritrea, 
in the Sudan and on the banks of the Don in Russia—three years filled 
with defeats and huge losses, with many killed, wounded, captured and 
missing in these far-away lands, and as well often unwarranted 
reproaches.220  
On July 29, 1943, U.S. General Dwight D. Eisenhower publicly “encouraged the 
Italian people to rise up against the German Army and promised allied help to free 
Italy.”221 A few days before, Italian King Victor Emmanuel III had ordered Mussolini 
arrested. Naturally, Hitler feared that the new Italian government would desert its ally, 
thus paving the way for an allied advance from the south.222 Furthermore, Hitler stated he 
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“did not want Italy to become a trap for our soldiers.”223 Italy’s new government 
surrendered secretly and unconditionally to the Anglo–Americans on September 3, 
confirming Hitler’s fears.224  
For Operation Oak, Hitler personally ordered Skorzeny to find and free his friend 
and ally, Mussolini.225 Skorzeny tracked the deposed dictator from the island of Ponza, to 
Santa Maddalena, and to his final holding location, the Hotel Imperatore on Gran Sasso, 
all while maintaining strict operational security.226 In the course of conducting aerial 
reconnaissance missions, Skorzeny’s Heinkel 111 aircraft crashed. Miraculously, his 
injuries consisted of only three broken ribs.227 Based on further reconnaissance, and 
terrain and resource limitations, Skorzeny concluded the only method to execute the raid 
was to crash-land gliders on the sloped alpine meadow adjacent to the hotel.228 
On September 12, 1943, Skorzeny and his 108-man force crash-landed twelve 
DFS 230 gliders in the vicinity of the hotel. A supporting force had isolated the objective 
by securing the cable car station at the bottom of Gran Sasso Mountain, severing its 
communications in the process. Within four minutes the compound was secure and 
Skorzeny had control of Mussolini—all without firing a shot.229 Shortly thereafter, 
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Skorzeny escorted Mussolini off Gran Sasso in a Fieseler 126 Storch aircraft, first taking 
him to Rome, and then Vienna, before a celebratory meeting with Hitler in Germany.230 
1. Analysis  
The success of Operation Oak can be attributed to Skorzeny’s daring plan, as well 
as his creative techniques for mitigating risk. Skorzeny ordered a “fundamental ban” on 
all participants firing their weapons before him.231 He included Italian carabinieri 
General Soleti on the raid in order to “momentarily confuse” the defending carabinieri 
soldiers.232 These unique features of the plan worked. The defending force reacted 
indecisively and with limited aggression.  
2. Importance 
Skorzeny’s raid had larger implications.233 In his book, To Dare and to Conquer: 
Special Operations and the Destiny of Nations, from Achilles to Al Qaeda, military 
historian Derek Leebaert highlighted the threefold strategic utility of Operation Oak as 
having deflated the Allies, validated Germany’s image of human and technological 
superiority, and enabled the creation of a social republic in northern Italy to continue 
fighting the Allies.234 According to Leebaert, “No amount of army divisions could have 
pulled this off.”235 Winston Churchill supported Leebaert’s view, stating, “[t]he rescue of 
Mussolini enabled the Germans to set up in the north a rival Government to Badoglio’s… 
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[which helped enable Italy] to become the battleground of some of the fiercest fighting in 
the war.”236 
D. OPERATION PANZERFAUST 
On September 10, 1944, Skorzeny was again summoned to the Wolfsschanze to 
meet with Hitler on an important matter at a critical time.237 Recent events had not boded 
well for Germany. The Americans and English had landed at Normandy on June 6 and 
were advancing from the west. In late June, a four-front Russian offensive broke through 
German lines in six places, tearing a 250-mile gap in the German eastern defense.238 July 
20 witnessed an assassination attempt on Hitler.239 In the south, Turkey had broken off 
diplomatic relations with Germany on August 2, and the Soviets had saturated Romania 
with troops.240 By September, Romania was completely under Soviet control, 
transitioning from German ally to enemy. Hungary, another German ally and buffer state 
to Soviet aggression, was wavering. As stated by Skorzeny, “Admiral [Miklos] Horthy 
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undertook some reshuffling in his ministry that suggested a change of course politically, 
and indeed in a pro-Soviet sense.”241  
1. The Mission 
Hitler again placed his faith in Skorzeny with a direct order to execute one, and if 
necessary, a second special mission to restore the Hungarian–German alliance.242 The 
first mission entailed kidnapping Admiral Horthy’s son, Niklas, who was known to be in 
secret communication with agents of Tito and Stalin. On October 15, while Niklas met 
discreetly with Tito’s agents in Budapest, the local SS commander in Budapest captured 
Niklas while Skorzeny and a small detachment fended off Niklas’s personal security 
element.243 Unfortunately, this audacious act failed to achieve its intended effect. Instead, 
“At 2 p.m. Hungarian radio broadcast a special announcement by Horthy, in which he 
said that ‘Hungary had asked the Soviet Union for a separate peace,’” thus necessitating 
the execution of Operation Panzerfaust (bazooka).244 
2. The Plan 
Operation Panzerfaust involved taking and occupying the Burgberg militarily in 
order to prevent a Hungarian peace deal with the Soviet Union.245 Skorzeny insisted on 
spilling as little blood as possible to prevent unnecessary negative repercussions for 
German–Hungarian relations.246 Skorzeny recognized that, “Hungarian soldiers had been 
battling a common enemy [Soviet Union] since June 1941, the same one which 
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devastated Hungary in 1920–21.”247 Skorzeny had faith that this history would aid his 
effort, but to capitalize on it, he again ordered that, “Not a single shot was to be fired 
from our side. As well there was a strict ban on replying to single shots.”248 Additionally, 
Skorzeny had previously dissuaded a German police commander from employing an 
excessively destructive 650mm howitzer cannon, dubbed “Thor,” as part of the raid.249 
Once again, Skorzeny’s plan worked. German forces, including large numbers of 
ethnic Hungarians, surrounded the Burgberg and simultaneously assaulted it on the 
morning of October 16. Entry was obtained in two ways: a parachute battalion breached 
the ministry of defense through a tunnel on the east side of the compound while Skorzeny 
led an armored column through the front gate, from which his assault force secured the 
building. Limited fighting occurred during the thirty-minute operation, but quickly ended 
when Skorzeny’s men fired warning shots from a new and fearsome anti-tank weapon 
known as the Panzerfaust.250 Skorzeny had accomplished another unbelievable mission. 
E. SIMILARITIES 
Operations Oak and Panzerfaust distinguished Skorzeny within the lineage of 
German irregular warfare professionals. Both operations demonstrated how single 
commando raids could achieve strategic success well beyond their tactical results.  
1. Operation Oak: Psychological Disarmament 
The liberation of Benito Mussolini at least partially reinforced Italian-fascist 
identity and its alliance with Germany, thus temporarily buttressing a critical German 
                                                 
247 Ibid., 315. 
248 Ibid., 317. 
249 Ibid., 314. 
250 Ibid., 320. The entire operation took its name from this weapon. Of note, total losses for both sides 
were only seven dead and twenty-seven wounded.  
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vulnerability against the ongoing Anglo–American offensive.251 Furthermore, Skorzeny 
revealed personal traits emblematic of an irregular warrior. His imaginative and daring 
infiltration plan overcame environmental challenges while retaining the element of 
surprise. The inclusion of General Soleti and Skorzeny’s orders not to shoot, countering 
conventional military inclinations, served to psychologically disarm the defending 
Italians. Finally, Skorzeny’s desire to personally lead reconnaissance missions and the 
raid maximized his control and ability to inspire. 
2. Panzerfaust: Strength through Restraint 
Operation Panzerfaust netted strategic gains on an equal scale to those achieved in 
Operation Oak. Skorzeny’s capture of the Burgberg shored up Admiral Horthy’s 
loyalties, to the degree that he halted Hungarian peace overtures with the Soviet Union. 
Thus, Germany could again rely on its eastern neighbor for defense, which directly 
supported Germany’s withdrawal from the east. It was Skorzeny’s bold approach and 
orders not to shoot that enabled the success of Panzerfaust, and his recognition of the 
psychological effects of the Panzerfaust weapon. In both operations, Skorzeny showed 
restraint and respect for his enemy, against whom he wished as little harm as necessary. 
F. INSPIRATIONS 
As much as he was a practitioner of irregular warfare, Skorzeny was also a 
student of the subject. British Special Air Service (SAS) operations in 1941 had inspired 
Skorzeny. In November of that year, SAS commandos executed a raid 200 miles behind 
German front lines in North Africa in an attempt to assassinate General Erwin Rommel 
and facilitate Operation Crusader, the British attempt to relieve Tobruk of German 
                                                 
251 According to World War II historian William L. Shirer, “By the early autumn of 1943, Adolf 
Hitler could well claim to have mastered the gravest threats to the Third Reich. The fall of Mussolini and 
the unconditional surrender of the Badoglio government in Italy might easily have led, as Hitler and his 
generals for a few crucial weeks feared, to exposing the southern borders of Germany to direct Allied 
attack and opening the way—from northern Italy—into the weakly held Balkans in the very rear of the 
German armies fighting for their lives in southern Russia.” William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the 
Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1959), 1006. 
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siege.252 Skorzeny observed, “It especially struck me that the British included a special 
commando operation in [the midst of] a conventional attack operation, which could have 
played a decisive role.”253 
Skorzeny also took note of Soviet partisan operations while serving on the eastern 
front. Although slow to take off, the Soviet partisan movement grew into a decisive 
supporting effort for the Red Army’s offensive into Germany. Scholars estimate that 
between the years 1941 and 1944, the partisans accounted for almost one million 
Germans killed and thousands of destroyed German locomotives, combat vehicles, and 
equipment.254 Skorzeny recalled, “we were fired on by groups of partisans while 
transitioning the woods through which we had to pass. They were still small units, made 
up of soldiers who had escaped our encirclement and escaped prisoners… Of every 
twenty villages we occupied two or three, while the others offered refuge to the 
partisans… .255 Later, in the role of historian, Skorzeny summarized the importance of 
the partisans to the Soviet counter-offensive:  
Still, it must be said that the catastrophe that followed the assault by 200 
Soviet divisions against Feldmarschall Busch’s 34 divisions on June 22, 
1944 was prepared by the partisans and special commando units of the 
Red Army. On June 19 and 20 alone more than 12,000 acts of sabotage 
were carried out behind Busch’s lines: bridges, railway lines, power plants 
were blown up, telephone and telegraph lines were cut. It was the largest 
operation in partisan war to that point, and as a result our units’ lines of 
communications and supply had been almost completely cut off when the 
huge attack began. From a tactical and strategic point of view, it was the 
partisan and commando units which achieved total victory.256 
                                                 
252 Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers, ed. B.H. Liddell Hart (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and 
Company, 1953). Note: Previously held by Italian forces, the British captured Tobruk in January 1941. 
Ibid., 94. Tobruk was one of the largest fortresses in North Africa and was strategically important due to its 
access to the Mediterranean Sea. Ibid., 154. 
253 Otto Skorzeny, My Commando Operations: The Memoirs of Hitler’s Most Daring Commando 
(Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1995), 149. 
254 Alexander Werth, Russia at War: 1941–1945 (New York, NY: Carroll and Graf Publishers, Inc., 
1964), 718. Note: Russian partisans operated in three primary areas: the Russian forest country (Leningrad, 
Porkhov, and Briask), Belorussia, and northern areas of the Ukraine. The height of the movement, 1943–
1944, saw approximately half-a-million armed partisans in the Soviet Union. Ibid., 726. 
255 Otto Skorzeny, My Commando Operations: The Memoirs of Hitler’s Most Daring Commando 
(Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1995), 109. 
256 Ibid., 305. 
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Skorzeny appreciated the value of partisan activity in irregular warfare. 
G. A NECESSARY OPTION  
In his book, Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. 
Foreign Policy, Lucien Vandebroucke warned that strategic special operations are “high 
risk ventures” in which failure means the loss of national prestige.257 His rather dim view 
is drawn from four examples of unsuccessful U.S. special operations, from which 
Vandenbroucke identified inadequate intelligence, poor coordination, wishful thinking, 
and inappropriate intervention in mission execution as reasons for failure. Skorzeny 
proved, however, that such mistakes could be avoided and that when properly executed, 
strategic special operations are worth the accompanying risks. Skorzeny understood the 
potential of special units like his own, asserting,  
Perfectly equipped and trained, determined battle groups, which are 
intelligently led, should always be capable of creating an unexpected 
situation, perhaps even—as I have said—before a conflict breaks out. 
During hostilities, commando units of technicians and propagandists could 
create confusion and perhaps chaos.258  
Skorzeny’s actions upheld a pattern within the German irregular warfare 
tradition—war waged with respect for the enemy, void of irrational emotion and 
traditional propagandistic views—clinical in nature. Above all, Skorzeny respected the 
power of individuals like himself, concluding, “They say that in a future war the ‘human’ 
factor will be seen as secondary. This is not my view.”259 
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VI. FRIEDRICH AUGUST FREIHERR VON DER HEYDTE 
German professor Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte’s 1972 book, 
Modern Irregular Warfare: In Defense Policy and as a Military Phenomenon, serves 
both as a theoretical study of irregular warfare and practical guide.260 Von der Heydte 
(Figure 8) referenced multiple examples of irregular war from places such as Greece, the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Latin America, Vietnam, China, and 
West Germany. West Germany, in particular, encountered Soviet “active measures” 
during the Cold War—in the form of anti-nuclear/anti-industrial terrorism—similar to the 
sort of covert action more recently practiced by Russia in eastern Ukraine.261 Von der 
Heydte offered a framework with which to approach irregular war. As a result of 
prohibitions on the use of force in international law, coupled with the threat posed by 
nuclear war, he acknowledged that, “Irregular is gradually displacing conventional ‘large-
scale’ warfare.”262 As an alternative to conventional and nuclear conflict, he proposed the 
use of irregular warfare as a strategic model—one that is militarily limited, politically 
total, and violent in nature. It is the current, potential application of this model, combined 
with von der Heydte’s deep, conceptual study of irregular warfare that makes his book so 
valuable.  
                                                 
260 Friedrich August von der Heydte, Modern Irregular Warfare: In Defense Policy and as a Military 
Phenomenon, 1st English ed. (New York, N.Y: New Benjamin Franklin House, 1986). This book was first 
published in German in 1972. 
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events and behavior in, and the actions of, foreign countries . . . includes attempts to influence the policies 
of another government, undermine confidence in its leaders and institutions, disrupt relations with other 
nations, and discredit and weaken governmental and non-governmental opponents.” Roy Godson and 
Richard Schultz, “Active Measures in Soviet Strategy,” Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World, 
Robbin F. Laird and Erik P. Hoffman editors (Hawthorne, NY: Aldine Publishing Co., 1986) 207. 
262 Von der Heydte, Modern Irregular Warfare, xxxiv. 
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Figure 8.  Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte  
A. BACKGROUND 
During World War II, then-Captain von der Heydte commanded the 1st Battalion, 
3rd Fallschirmjäger Regiment in the Battle of Crete (1941).263 This first-ever, mass 
airborne invasion was Germany’s attempt to cement its Balkan campaign success that had 
thus far culminated with victories in Greece and Yugoslavia.264 Crete’s strategic value 
stemmed from its location in the eastern Mediterranean.  
Following the fall of Greece, Allied ground forces reinforced their defense of 
Crete, augmented by an underestimated partisan resistance force. The British Royal Navy 
dominated the surrounding Mediterranean Sea. In light of Allied disposition, the 
Germans chose to attack with airborne troops supported by the Luftwaffe, testing the 
new—and thus irregular—tactic of airborne envelopment.   
                                                 
263 Heydte, Baron von der. Daedalus Returned. Trans. W. Stanley Moss. London: Hutchinson and 
Company: 1958, 20. 
264 John Keegan, The Second World War (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1989), 160. 
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Von der Heydte’s unit was responsible for capturing the northern town of Canea 
and securing nearby Suda Bay. From this objective and others, the Germans intended to 
expand their dominance of the island “like a spreading oil-spot.”265 Beginning on May 
20, and over the course of eight days, the Germans ultimately prevailed, but they suffered 
enormous casualties in the process. As a result, Hitler resolved to ban future large-scale 
airborne operations whereas the Allies chose to further develop and employ their own 
such capabilities. Von der Heydte, “an untypical parachutist by reason both of his 
aristocratic disdain for Nazism and of his marked intellectuality,” chronicled the Battle of 
Crete in Daedalus Returned—the title indicative of his lifelong interest in the island’s 
mythological Greek history.266, 267   
Following World War II and a distinguished career in the post-war German 
Bundeswehr, von der Heydte entered academia. There, he employed his extensive 
military experience, observations of Soviet irregular warfare tactics throughout West 
Germany, and exhaustive study to publish his groundbreaking overview of irregular 
warfare. 
B. CENTRAL IDEAS 
Von der Heydte pointedly depicted the essence of irregular warfare as “war out of 
the dark.”268 Its irregular nature is characterized by small groups of combatants, where 
success depends on the accumulation of many small, unconventional-type operations 
over time.269 These may include: robberies, acts of terrorism, sabotage, bombings, and 
other attacks. Superiority in movement is prioritized over firepower, and stealth over 
overwhelming mass.270  
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1. The Purpose of Irregular Warfare 
The purpose of irregular war “is not only a military victory, but also a total 
political victory.”271 Perhaps most important, von der Heydte argued that irregular war is 
“real war,” and as such, long preceded the current concept of conventional war that is 
restricted by, and tied to, international law. Irregular warfare can include multiple types 
of violence, not all of which are military in nature. After all, “It was not the military 
which created war—it was war which led to the development of the military.”272  
2. Challenges to International Law and Combination Warfare 
Von der Heydte claimed that the phenomenon of irregular warfare challenges 
international law and conventional strategy. With respect to the former, war is an 
exceptional condition, whereas peace is considered the norm. In an effort to control the 
exceptional condition, international law requires both the recognition of armed groups in 
conflict and the expression of their intent, both of which may be disadvantageous to those 
who wage irregular war at various times. Von der Heydte believed, “[t]he laws and norms 
of war are oriented to the ‘large’ war, ‘conventional’ war, not irregular war.”273 This 
remains true today. 
Von der Heydte contended that international law is linked to military strategy, 
which in turn is understood as conforming to international law. Thus, conventional 
military strategy is often at odds with irregular strategy, wherein “[t]he adversary is not 
decisively beaten, but instead he is decisively outmaneuvered.”274 Strategy within 
irregular warfare, however, is not unique, but rather, “[t]he application of generally valid 
maxims of a strategy of war under the special circumstances of an irregular war.”275 
Irregular war is fundamentally a war of attrition, fought indirectly, with significant 
psychological factors; an idea serves as the primary motivator for those waging it. 
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Von der Heydte suggested that only recently had warfare fractured to form a 
spectrum consisting of irregular, conventional, and nuclear war.276 The advent of nuclear 
weapons created a new, extreme version of warfare as compared to the more mainstream, 
or conventional, forms of warfare witnessed in the two world wars. Similarly, irregular 
warfare also represents an extreme form of warfare, based on its tactical variances and 
legal incongruities. Irregular warfare is traditionally considered the tool of the weak, 
whereas conventional and nuclear warfare are tools of the strong.277 In reality though, 
powerful nations maintain the capability to employ all three types. The ability to 
synergistically accomplish this in the future will likely increasingly differentiate success 
from failure.  
3. Reasons for Employment 
Von der Heydte observed that the employment of irregular warfare may be 
situationally dependent. According to him, “It [may be] advisable to begin a war, which 
one wants to conduct as a conventional war, as an irregular war, or to begin a war, in 
which one is firmly determined from the outset to use nuclear weapons, with a 
conventional attack.”278 It may also be worthwhile to employ two types of war 
simultaneously, such as the hybrid conventional–irregular strategy that the North 
Vietnamese employed against the United States in South Vietnam (1965–1973). In any 
case, an aggressor benefits from concealing the type of war that he intends to employ as 
well as the type of war that he intends to transition to because the ambiguity associated 
with the enemy’s knowledge of this information directly corresponds to strategic 
advantage.  
                                                 
276 Ibid., 47. Von der Heydte further notes, “In more than one respect, irregular warfare is the total 
opposite of nuclear war . . . One might, to mention one example, speak of the primacy of fire-power over 
movement in nuclear war, and the primacy of movement over fire-power in irregular war.” Von der 
Heydte, Modern Irregular Warfare, 60.  
277 Ibid., 64. Von der Heydte points out that the “weaker force” in irregular war frequently receives 
support from a “stronger power.”  
278 Ibid., 50. 
 80
Next, von der Heydte conceptualized irregular war as a “war of blurred 
contours.”279 For example, “in modern irregular warfare, all inhabitants of a state are 
potentially combatants... groups [as opposed to soldiers] confront each other,” and these 
groups are only “legally limited by a few primitive humanitarian principles, which form 
the core of the law of war.”280 As the primary combatants in irregular war, “[g]uerilleros 
are, in their own self-conception, neither soldiers nor civilians. Instead, they make claim 
to a special status, which is not that of a soldier bound by the conventions of a ‘large’ 
war, but also not that of an unjustified fighter, nor of a civilian who merely surrenders to 
the laws and courts of the adversary.”281 
4. The Guerrilla’s Objective 
With no distinct battlefield or front, it is a goal of the guerrillas who wage 
irregular war to maintain unlimited freedom of movement. Instead of occupying space, 
von der Heydte spoke of “contaminated” space that requires the enemy’s over-application 
of resources to counter. The contaminated areas carry an, “incalculable risk for the enemy 
. . . death lurks in them.”282 For those with firsthand experience in insurgency and 
counterinsurgency, this description rings true. Von der Heydte also differentiates between 
internal “bases” that must be small, secret, and dispersed and “outside” bases that can be 
larger and supplied by third parties. 
Von der Heydte depicted irregular war as “war in peace,” where the transition 
from peace to war is often blurred.283 In this way, irregular war differs from more 
conventional conflicts. Because they are typically wars of attrition, irregular wars tend to 
last longer as well. As a result, he maintained, “Freedom of action in time sometimes is 
of even greater importance in irregular warfare than freedom of action in space.”284 
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Mobility is emphasized over firepower. The two fundamental types of infiltration 
distinctive to irregular mobility are: the infiltration of unfamiliar terrain and the 
infiltration of populations.285  
C. VON DER HEYDTE’S THREE-PHASE MODEL  
Von der Heydte acknowledged Mao Tse-Tung’s three-phased model of irregular 
warfare (organization, insurgency, and the war of maneuver), while presenting one of his 
own. Von der Heydte’s version consisted of a preparation phase, a covert-combat phase, 
and a transition-to-open-combat phase. Von der Heydte’s book and model differ from 
Mao’s book, On Guerrilla Warfare, and from Mao’s model.286 First, von der Heydte’s 
book addressed irregular war more broadly than Mao’s. The latter’s writing focused on 
the situation he faced in agrarian China. Second, von der Heydte’s model addressed the 
preparation phase of irregular warfare in more detail. Third, von der Heydte’s model 
intentionally did not include “open combat,” otherwise considered a war of maneuver or 
conventional war.  
1. The Preparation Phase 
a. Conspiracy 
Von der Heydte’s preparation phase begins with conspiracy. The conspiratorial 
foundation includes sworn oaths, development of cadre, initial battle plan, network 
development, and emergence of a charismatic leader who is capable of and eager to 
lead.287 Von der Heydte differentiated between conspiracies from within, outside, above, 
and below. Each carries unique contextual implications such as where support is derived 
from, whom the irregular force consists of, and what the irregular force intends to target. 
Von der Heydte identified the historical importance of officers, priests, party bureaucrats, 
and students to the conspiracy. 
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b. Propaganda 
Propaganda, often in the form of subversion, has an important role in the 
preparation phase. Propaganda’s function is threefold: “[First] to arm the ranks of the first 
cadre intellectually and morally for what is coming... [second to] proliferate the idea, on 
behalf of which irregular war is to be waged, among broad layers of the population, and 
win new members or friends for the movement… [and third], it should weaken the 
adversary’s power and will to resist.”288 Propaganda is psychological combat designed to 
lay the groundwork for the next phase.  
c. Training  
Training and supply requirements are inherent to the preparation phase. Training 
priorities may include physical training, vocational training, and all forms of combat.289 
Notably, “Sometimes guerilleros are trained by their later [future] adversary.”290 Irregular 
war’s equipment requirement calculations must be done more carefully than in “large” 
war due to the general lack of dedicated supply channels. This necessitates more varied 
sources of procurement, including grey and/or black markets, third party actors, and 
battlefield recovery operations.291 Storage of supplies must also be given careful 
consideration and typically requires heavy redundancy.292 These logistics issues speak to 
the dangerous tendency to underestimate the complexity of irregular warfare in 
comparison to large-scale conventional operations. 
2. The Covert-Combat Phase 
The covert-combat phase begins with the first violent acts—characterized as 
“combat in the dark.”293 Covert combat is still real combat. The covert distinction 
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implies that the attacker employs a high degree of cover to safeguard his identity.294 The 
goals of covert acts are two-fold: to wear down the enemy so that he is incapable of 
sustaining subsequent attacks in the next phase; and to separate the enemy from the 
population psychologically.295 The continuation of all the actions of the first phase into 
the second is of great importance because each phase adds to those of the previous phase 
but does not replace them, creating a natural continuity.296  
a. Terrorism 
Covert combat encompasses terrorism, sabotage, assassinations, and raids. Long 
before it received serious global attention, von der Heydte recognized terrorism as a 
legitimate warfare tactic, stating, “[i]n terrorism, the criminal act becomes an act of 
war.”297 The first purpose of terrorism is to intimidate and scare the enemy while 
convincing the population of the enemy’s weakness. The second purpose is to provoke 
the enemy into counter-terror or overly aggressive retaliatory measures.298 Acts of terror 
can range from explosions and arson to kidnapping and vandalism. Von der Heydte 
conceded, however, that terrorism by itself rarely succeeds in accomplishing strategic 
objectives.299  
b. Sabotage 
Sabotage, or the “premeditated, deliberate hindrance, disruption, or destruction of 
a business, factory, or a transportation, supply, or communications facility by means of 
deliberate damage, usually—but not always—by employing violence,” aims to achieve 
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material effects as opposed to the psychological effects sought through terrorism.300 
Sabotage can be violent or non-violent, and its employment may only require a single 
individual to carry out. Subtle and creative acts can net excessive material destruction.301 
c. Assassination 
Assassinations, or executions, are an important tool in the covert-combat phase. 
They are intended to send a message by killing specific people. According to von der 
Heydte, “Executions are primarily directed against traitors or other recalcitrants in one’s 
own ranks.”302 Traitors can also be identified and targeted outside of the ranks of the 
irregular force, and “revolutionary tribunals” are often employed to legitimize 
executions.303  
d. Raids 
The final operational act characteristic of the Covert Combat phase is the raid. 
Raids are short duration surprise attacks against enemy installations, intended to destroy 
and/or capture material, and followed by a planned withdrawal.304 Raids also often inflict 
a psychological wound on the enemy and motivate others to aid the cause of the 
guerrilla.305  
Von der Heydte also offered insight into third-party support, leadership, 
communication, and reconnaissance during the covert-combat phase. He cited American 
diplomat and author Charles W. Thayer to summarize the qualities required of a leader in 
irregular warfare. In addition to traits associated with regular military commanders, 
certain political and civil skills are required to facilitate population control. In-depth 
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knowledge of terrain and an area’s socio-economic factors is critical.306 Irregular leaders 
must also remain as mobile as possible and process decisions with speed.307  
3. The Transition to Open Combat 
The final phase in von der Heydte’s model is transition to open combat. This is 
when traditional battles occur while all the previously executed actions associated with 
the preparation and covert-combat phases simultaneously continue.308 Each battle has a 
concrete purpose related to tactical and strategic gains. The notions of attack and defense 
become tangible, or real.309 It is in this phase where the guerrilla steps “out of the dark” 
and is no longer anonymous.310 International law becomes relevant again for the irregular 
force, but still faces challenges of application. For instance, the point at which guerrillas, 
with no association to a sovereign state, become legally accountable for their actions 
according to the Geneva Conventions is unclear.311  
Von der Heydte distinguished battles in irregular warfare from those in regular 
warfare, stating, “The battle in irregular warfare is essentially a battle of light, 
independently operating units.”312 The irregular battle is characterized by employment of 
infantry weapons, a continued requirement for strict and anticipatory munitions planning, 
limited reinforcement capability, and the need to maximize use of terrain. Surprise 
remains essential during the transition phase.313 
The goal of the transition phase is to isolate the enemy spatially, into what von der 
Heydte termed “islands.”314 Once this is accomplished, the transition to open combat is 
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complete, at which point the guerrillas transform themselves into conventional armed 
forces and proceed to “politically and militarily liquidate the islands.”315 At this point, 
the force previously defined as irregular has transformed into a “large” conventional 
force; thus ending von der Heydte’s irregular warfare analysis. Von der Heydte 
concluded his book by identifying irregular warfare counter-measures by phase, 
concentrating on intelligence, force dispositions, and psychology. 
D. SUMMARY  
In summary, Von der Heydte’s Modern Irregular Warfare provided wide-ranging 
insight into irregular warfare application. It combined irregular warfare theory, historical 
examples, and prescriptive recommendations, but was distinguished by four key ideas:  
1. Strong nations should consider the employment of irregular warfare and 
the employment of multiple types of warfare, sequentially or 
simultaneously.  
2. An alternative to Mao’s three-phase irregular warfare model exists, one 
that more adequately addresses irregular warfare preparation. 
3. Terrorism is warfare and must be conceptualized as such.  
4. New legal regulations are required to better address irregular warfare.  
Von der Heydte’s proposal for the employment of irregular warfare in 
combination with other forms of warfare is particular relevant today. As powerful nations 
find themselves increasingly frustrated by the tactics and strategies of lesser nations and 
stateless extremist groups, it is time to reevaluate response and prevention strategies. 
Combination warfare, characterized by a mix of irregular, nuclear, and/or conventional 
warfare, may hold real solutions.  
Similarly, von der Heydte’s elevation of terrorism from criminal act to warfare 
tactic is also important. Although it remains largely unaccepted, the employment of terror 
continues to occur, often with seemingly effective results. Rather than rush to slap the 
“terrorist label” on various groups, perhaps further strategic thought into the employment 
of terrorism (and counter-terrorism)—in military context—is called for.  
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Von der Heydte’s book was cutting-edge for its time, and in many ways, remains 
so today. As an added bonus, the 1986 reprint of Modern Irregular Warfare included an 
interview with the author in which he discussed how various recent historical events of 
the time validated his previously published ideas. Considering current violent Russian 
aggression in the Ukraine, Chinese belligerence in the South China Sea, and radical 
Islamic groups’ attacks in the West, it is apparent that irregular warfare is the global tool 
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VII. OTTO HEILBRUNN  
Although often viewed in terms of large-scale, industrially driven, state-on-state 
conflict—think World Wars I and II—the twentieth century also witnessed many 
irregular warfare campaigns. World War II, in fact, was the first war in which “[t]he 
entire rear area was thus recognized as a theatre of war for sustained operations by 
soldiers and civilians”—a theatre tasked to partisans and Special Forces.316 At the time, 
rear area activity included airborne operations, sabotage, supply to resistance movements, 
and general partisan warfare, but remarkably, “[n]o clear pattern evolved for the conduct 
of the war in the rear.”317 It was precisely this problem that attracted the interest of 
German author Otto Heilbrunn (1906–1969; Figure 9).318  
 
Figure 9.  Otto Heilbrunn 
                                                 
316 Otto Heilbrunn, Warfare In the Enemy’s Rear (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), 24. 
317 Ibid., 28. 
318 Heilbrunn became a British subject shortly after World War II. 
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In 1954, following a life in academia and a stint as a United States assistant 
counsel at the Nuremberg trials, Heilbrunn began publishing books and articles geared 
toward partisan (guerrilla) warfare, terrorism, nuclear security, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, insurgency, the Soviet secret police, and Cold War military strategy. This 
chapter will specifically address Heilbrunn’s ideas on partisan and anti-partisan warfare, 
air power and nuclear war in relation to partisan operations, and terrorism.  
A. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Early on, Heilbrunn’s writing focused on partisan and anti-partisan operations in 
the rear areas of regular armies, as exemplified by Russian partisan efforts against the 
German Wehrmacht in World War II (WWII). Coinciding with a rise in irregular warfare 
throughout Asia; namely Mao Tse-Tung’s Chinese Communist revolution (1916–1949), 
the First Indochina War (1946–1954) and the U.S. Vietnam War (1965–1973); the term 
“partisan” lost traction to the more globally recognized “guerrilla.” Heilbrunn’s diction 
shifted accordingly.  
Although he never formally defined the term “partisan,” or “guerrilla,” for that 
matter, Heilbrunn’s work certainly projected a clear image of their shared meaning. 
Regardless, a short discussion of both terms is worthwhile.  
The term “partisan” has its roots in eighteenth century Europe, when it was “used 
to designate a regular detachment leader employed in skirmishes… [who] was often also 
a military entrepreneur.”319 Later, during the Napoleonic Age, partisan equated with 
“freedom fighter.”320 By the twentieth century, partisan had evolved to include a wider 
connotation. Depending on the situation, a partisan could be understood as a guerrilla-
style freedom fighter, patriot, or insurgent; as illegitimate by his enemies; as one who 
arises from rural populations; as a wager of “little war” or “peoples’ war;” and as one 
who employs unconventional tactics while attacking the enemy where he is weak.321 As 
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previously stated, this Euro-centric term has since been almost completely phased out, in 
favor of the more broadly understood term, guerrilla. This author will attempt to mirror 
Heilbrunn’s use of the two terms to the highest degree possible for the sake of academic 
clarity.322 
B. MODELS FOR PARTISAN WARFARE  
Heilbrunn evaluated partisan warfare broadly, a concept within which he 
proposed two distinct partisan models. The auxiliary model is characterized by partisans 
operating in support of a regular army “to contribute toward the defeat of the enemy by 
extending the war behind the enemy’s front lines.”323 To do so, partisans employ 
assassinations, sabotage, raids, and ambushes. They also collect intelligence to facilitate 
army operations and disrupt communications and movement. All of these actions “create 
intolerable conditions for the enemy … and frustrate all their measures.”324 The auxiliary 
model was exemplified by Russian partisan operations against the German Wehrmacht 
from 1941–1945—a historic success not without precedent. 
1. Auxiliary Partisans: the Russian Example 
Russians have demonstrated a propensity for employing auxiliary partisan 
warfare. In 1812, Russian partisans famously decimated Napoleon’s French army as it 
retreated westward following the invasion of Russia. Karl Marx, in an 1849 speech, 
emphasized,  
A nation, fighting for its liberty, ought not to adhere rigidly to the 
accepted rules of warfare. Mass uprisings, revolutionary methods, guerilla 
[sic] bands everywhere; such are the only means by which a small nation 
can hope to maintain itself against an adversary superior in numbers and 
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equipment. By their use a weaker force can overcome its stronger and 
better-organized opponent.325  
When German forces invaded his country in 1941, Joseph Stalin appealed to this 
history: 
This signifies that in our country front and rear constitute a single 
indivisible fighting camp… [t]he struggle of the enslaved peoples against 
the regime of the German-fascist highwaymen is beginning to assume 
general scope. Sabotage at war plants, the blowing up of German 
ammunition stores, the wrecking of German troop trains and the killing of 
German soldiers and officers have become everyday occurrences in all the 
occupied countries… swept by the flames of partisan warfare… [m]en and 
women guerillas—to intensify partisan warfare in the rear of the German 
invaders, destroy the enemy’s communications and transport facilities, to 
destroy the headquarters and equipment of the enemy, and not to spare any 
cartridges against the oppressors of our motherland!326 
Notably, the Wehrmacht’s Russian offensive represented one of the first times in 
history that there existed a front line of such length, stretching many hundreds of miles. 
This line required enormous in-depth support the farther it advanced, creating a rear area 
susceptible to Russian partisans.327 Development of airlift and radio further aided the 
partisan effort by enabling resupply and direct communication between partisans and 
army units. 
The Russian partisans were largely motivated by patriotism, which Heilbrunn 
considered essential to the auxiliary partisan model.328 This patriotic response resulted 
from Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union, but was significantly augmented by the 
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harsh treatment that the Germans inflicted upon the Russian population.329 Partisan 
leadership further stoked the partisan flame with reminders of earlier successful efforts 
against Napoleon’s army.330  
2. The Independent Model: Mao’s Guerrillas 
Heilbrunn’s second partisan model is the independent model. In this case, the 
partisans operate sans regular military forces, but typically benefit from external material 
support. Independent partisan warfare occurs in the form of revolution or insurgency and 
is predominantly motivated by discontent. The independent model has its own strategic 
goals, whereas auxiliary partisans simply support the strategic aims of the regular army. 
Mao Tse-Tung’s communist guerrilla revolution exemplified the independent 
model. Mao’s Communists arose in opposition to the ruling Chinese nationalists, known 
as the Kuomintang, who employed counter-revolutionary terror tactics and conventional 
military operations in an attempt to crush the Communists.331 For their sake, the 
Communists relied on the peasant masses by “recognizing and exploiting two things they 
had to offer: a reservoir of discontent… and a reservoir of labor.”332  
Although the Communists were primarily motivated by discontent, they were also 
inspired by patriotism.333 Imperial Japan had invaded Chinese Manchuria in 1931, 
initiating years of Japanese oppression. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 
1941, the Kuomintang marginally lessened their resistance efforts against the Japanese—
especially after a series of defeats—figuring that the United States would do their work 
for them. Conversely, the Communists used the Japanese aggression to galvanize greater 
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support. Therefore, motivation for Mao’s Communists stemmed from both internally 
originating discontent and externally oriented patriotism.334  
C. ORGANIZATION AND DESIGN 
After motivation, partisan movements require an organizational design. This is 
primarily determined by whether the partisan movement fights in support of an army or 
independently. If the former, the partisan movement liaises with the Army, but remains 
subordinate. If the latter, the partisan movement may choose to infiltrate an existing 
organization, “as the Mau Mau leaders did by using the Kenya African Union.”335 
Heilbrunn proposed seven organizational models, all of which are hierarchical in nature, 
with variations in political–military authority, chain-of-command structure, and degree of 
subordination to the army.336 Like others though, he did not anticipate the future impact 
of networks as they relate to irregular warfare. 
1. Political and Military Relationships 
Political and military authorities dually influenced Russian partisan organization 
and command. Stalin and the Communist Party provided leadership, indoctrination, 
material, and spiritual support down to the local levels.337 Simultaneously, “[e]very 
[partisan] detachment of some importance was in regular wireless contact with the 
General Staff of the Red Army from which it received instructions.”338 The Chinese 
Communist guerrillas, on the other hand, had only one chain of command, over which 
Mao presided. There was no conventional military to support or report through. 
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2. Strategizing According to Model 
Heilbrunn reasoned that partisan strategy was also differentiated by model type. 
Independent movements, such as Mao’s, have distinct strategic aims because they must 
eventually fight at the front in an effort to defeat the enemy on their own.339 As such, the 
independents usually require outside support to achieve their aims.340 Auxiliary 
movements lack strategic aims, but do have general objectives; namely, they strive “to 
deprive the enemy of reinforcements, arms, equipment, and supplies; to drain his 
manpower; and to give direct combat support to the front.”341  
Independent partisan movements’ successes depend upon their ability to gain and 
retain operational initiative, destroy the initiative and will of their enemy, and win the 
over the population. They are aided in this by anti-partisan efforts to protect the 
population, which require dispersion of enemy forces and create stationary targets. 
Conversely, the guerrillas are not responsible for protecting anything and can blend into 
the population, which offers them the ultimate freedom of maneuver.342  
In the Communist Chinese example, “[t]he nationalists, as the lawful government, 
had to assert their authority all over the country.”343 So, even though they began as a 
much larger force, their dispersion offered Mao’s guerrillas, who were primarily located 
in China’s northwest, an opportunity to surround and defeat pockets of Nationalists one at 
a time, in detail. Mao’s guerrillas retained initiative, gained strength, and weakened the 
morale of the increasingly defensive-minded and static Nationalists, who became passive. 
The Communists proved over time that the Nationalists could not protect the population, 
whereas Mao’s guerrillas worked hard to do just that—psychologically and physically. If 
executed properly by the guerrillas, these victories build momentum that is hard to 
overcome.344 
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Auxiliary movements must achieve their objectives through a combination of 
intelligence gathering and operational acts in support of the regular army. In the case of 
the Russian partisans, they served as both fighting units and as an intelligence agency for 
the Red Army.345 They facilitated the Red Army’s initial retreat by harassing the German 
rear. Then, they later helped spearhead its offensive into Germany by providing 
intelligence regarding weak points, or gaps, in the German front. This enabled army 
forces to mass on these weak points to achieve quick and decisive penetrations.346 One 
task in particular, in which the Russian partisans excelled, was assisting the Red Army in 
river crossings by securing bridging material and seizing bridges at specified times.347 
D. MODELS FOR COOPERATIVE ACTION 
Rarely have partisans decisively determined the outcome of war in their own 
right. Even independent partisan movements typically require some form of external 
assistance, whether that be safe haven, supplies, training, or otherwise.  
1. Auxiliary Partisans and the Regular Army  
Partisan-regular army cooperation in the auxiliary model is necessary because it 
prevents counter-productive actions, by either element, and enables the partisans to 
lighten the tasks of the regulars.348 Heilbrunn estimated that: 
[t]he practical forms of co-operation, apart from sending supplies, may be 
summarized as follows: 1. Liaison officers and agents may be sent to 
allied partisans … 2. Army officers may train guerillas … 3. Army 
officers may take command of [guerrilla] detachments … 4. Army officers 
may form or take command of the entire [guerrilla] movement … 5. An 
army unit may co-operate with partisans: (a) In special assignments … (b) 
In battle … (c) In Campaigns … .349 
All the above forms of cooperation remain applicable today. 
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Heilbrunn delineated two methods for intelligence cooperation. Either the 
partisans collect intelligence and pass it to the army, or the army embeds intelligence 
officers into the partisan movement.350 In both cases, success hinges on partisan 
subordination to the army and the advanced preparation of partisan movements to 
minimize susceptibility to the enemy.351  
Heilbrunn saw a particularly complementary relationship between special 
operations forces (SOF) and partisans. Similar to U.S. SOF operations in Afghanistan, he 
noted the inherent ability of SOF to “stiffen partisan resistance and do the precision work, 
but partisans are needed for mass output. “ Furthermore, the partisans would be expected 
to maintain long duration presence after SOF were required to move onto other trouble 
areas.352 Heilbrunn’s preconditions for infiltrating SOF for partisan link-up were: the 
selected terrain supports guerrilla warfare; the population is capable of supporting the 
guerrilla force; the population is willing to fight and serve under foreign military 
leadership; capable and reliable indigenous leadership is not available, thus establishing 
the requirement for foreign leadership in the form of SOF; the presence of SOF will not 
create rifts in the guerrilla movement; and the movement can be kept under control.353 
The above precondition that requires SOF leadership in the absence of effective foreign 
leadership implies that the SOF presence must be enduring until such leadership is 
established and proven. This point will remain critical to current and future U.S. SOF 
relationships with foreign partner forces and must be taken into consideration when 
considering these strategic relationships. 
2. Air Power 
Heilbrunn also studied the relationship between partisans and air power. In 
particular, he drew conclusions based on cooperation between Filipinos and the American 
Air Force in WWII, the Soviet air force and its corresponding partisan movement, also in 
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WWII, and the post-WWII guerrilla theaters of operation in Greece, Malaya, Indo-China, 
Cyprus, and Algeria. He assessed aerial fire support and supply to be the two priority 
ways in which air power could contribute to partisan warfare.354 In each case, the 
embedding of liaison officers enhanced operational effectiveness.355  
Air power is more likely to be used decisively in anti-partisan operations as 
opposed to in support of partisans, due to the nature of the partisans’ comparative lack of 
air assets. On the topic of air power, Heilbrunn concluded, “that the pattern for use of air-
power in anti-guerrilla warfare has been set, and that no great changes can be expected in 
the future.” New technologies such as drones, satellites, and cyber, however, now 
challenge this assertion. 
3. Issues in Nuclear War 
In the prospect of nuclear war, Heilbrunn foresaw specific partisan roles. He 
believed that partisans would not be susceptible to nuclear attack because they were too 
small a target and typically operated behind enemy lines. However, he determined they 
could contribute in such a war by preventing an enemy’s employment of nuclear weapons 
or by facilitating favorable conditions for the use of nuclear weapons on the part of their 
own side.356 In the former case, partisans could also prevent an enemy’s exploitation 
following nuclear weapon employment. In the latter case, partisan forces could influence 
the enemy either to concentrate or disperse his troops based on strategic intent.357 
E. ANTI-PARTISAN OPERATIONS 
In his study of Russian partisans, Heilbrunn made extensive observations 
regarding the German anti-partisan response. The German Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the 
intelligence branch of the SS, was responsible for securing the German army rear, while 
the Wehrmacht was responsible for fighting on the front lines. This policy failed for three 
reasons. First, the SD did not have enough people and resources to properly secure the 
                                                 
354 Otto Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 123. 
355 Ibid., 124. 
356 Otto Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 141. 
357 Otto Heilbrunn, Warfare In the Enemy’s Rear (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), 206. 
 99
vast rear areas of the Wehrmacht as it drove into the Soviet Union. Second, the partisans 
avoided the strength of the Army, its front lines, thereby making most anti-partisan 
efforts irrelevant. And third, the guidance from Germany’s senior leadership to 
relentlessly liquidate all partisans and partisan supporters led to brutal anti-partisan 
measures that served as a recruiting tool for the partisan cause.358 To the last point, Dixon 
and Heilbrunn added, “[a]nd had they [the Germans] allowed themselves to be dictated 
by reason and clemency rather than by hate and terror, they might not have had to fight 
the partisans on more than a moderate scale.”359 This was especially true in the Ukraine.  
Dixon and Heilbrunn credited certain German commanders with correcting their 
early anti-partisan mistakes. Namely, they point out that commander and chief of the 
German 11th army, Erich von Manstein, established an “anti-partisan” staff, headed by 
an operational officer, “to direct the partisan combat from a central point in order to co-
ordinate and make fullest use of information we gathered, in the same way as the 
partisans on their part must have had some hidden central direction.”360 Overall though, 
the German SD and Wehrmacht personnel on the ground were provided little tactical and 
operational guidance for combating the partisans, for which Heilbrunn and Dixon 
concluded, “[o]ur Army [the British] needs a field manual for anti-guerilla warfare 
now.”361  
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Effective anti-guerrilla leaders require a strong grasp of intelligence collection, 
policing techniques for the defense, and military operations for the offense.362 The 
combination of intelligence and policing enables the identification and separation of the 
guerrilla from the population. Because guerrillas depend on the population and are 
usually of the population, “[t]he art of defeating the guerillas is therefore the art of 
turning the populace against them.”363 To do this, the anti-guerrilla must intimately know 
and understand the population, which takes time. Thus, “[the guerrilla’s] chances of 
successfully forming a movement gradually decrease the longer a vigilant enemy has 
been in occupation.”364  
2. Demoralization and Incentive to Surrender 
Heilbrunn elaborated on anti-guerrilla tactics by arguing that the population must 
be protected against the guerrillas, converted away from guerrilla propaganda, and any 
hostile population must be isolated.365 Likewise, he argued that the guerrillas must be 
demoralized and denied access to supplies, recruits, and territory. They must be 
incentivized to surrender, which is one reason to limit harsh treatment of detainees.366 
One way to protect the population from the guerrillas is to enlist the population in home 
defense forces—a tactic employed with some success by the United States military in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, employing the Sons of Iraq and the Afghan Local Police, 
respectively. This provides the local population with work, some form of payment, and 
naturally pits them against the guerrilla movement.367 
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3. Counter-Offensive Operations 
Heilbrunn determined that the anti-partisan has his choice of three primary 
offensive operations: the employment of commandos, the employment of pseudo-gangs, 
and encirclement.  
a. Commandos 
The Germans successfully experimented with commando units in WWII. These 
Jagdkommandos, as they were known, were small groups of highly trained fighters that 
hunted the partisans on their own turf, employing surprise, stealth, and aggression.368 
They saw to it “that the bands [partisans] never got rest.”369 The United States employed 
a similar concept in both Afghanistan and Iraq—helicopter mobile commando strike 
forces.  
b. Pseudo-Gangs 
Pseudo-gangs are another tool available to the anti-partisan. The Germans used 
pseudo-gangs effectively against Russian partisans. These gangs, “masqueraded as bands 
and their purpose was to check on the morale of the population and make contact with 
bands.”370 Thus, they served as an intelligence and targeting tool. In other pseudo-gang 
examples, such as in Kenya when the British fought against the Mau Maus, the pseudo-
gangs would go so far as to infiltrate the enemy, then capture or kill him when he least 
expected it.371 This more aggressive technique, however, risks sensitizing the enemy to 
the threat, thus limiting its long-term effectiveness.  
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c. Encirclement 
Finally, Heilbrunn advocated the encirclement technique to eliminate partisan 
movements. The Germans documented encirclement in their anti-partisan manual, which 
explained, “the basic maxim of this technique is to cut off every escape route and then 
systematically to annihilate all parts of the band.”372 Of course, encirclement may require 
significant numbers of anti-partisans. An alternative technique is available, known as the 
“surprise hunt and attack.” This entails surprising the guerrillas, forcing them to fight, 
and then pursuing and exploiting those who attempt to flee.373 
Heilbrunn concluded his anti-partisan research with the following general rules 
(emphasis added):  
1) Fight a short war. Do not give the enemy time to gain strength and 
superiority;  
2) Attack first the enemy’s strongest points. Go for his bases;  
3) The major objective is not to hold a front line or a defense line of forts 
but to annihilate the enemy’s fighting strength;  
4) Do not hold more ground than you can afford to. If your forces are 
insufficient to seal up the enemy, establish base areas;  
5) Do not give the enemy the chance to encircle you;  
6) Keep up the offensive spirit among your troops;  
7) Surprise is a main element of successful anti-guerilla tactics. Use your 
air force to achieve surprise and to increase the profitable deployment of 
your troops;  
8) Penetrate the enemy by forming pseudo-gangs;  
9) Isolate the enemy by denying him access to the population and cutting 
his supply lines;  
10) Improve your communications;  
11) Keep your static defenses to a minimum. The friendly population will 
provide Home Guards for self-defense. In hostile areas guard troops are 
only required in order to prevent supplies from reaching the enemy. If 
necessary the population must be resettled;  
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12) Do not treat the population and guerilla prisoners harshly. Reprisals 
should be taken against the population only if it is protected but still helps 
the partisans.374  
 
In light of recent U.S. experiences, the highlighted points deserve special 
emphasis. Clearly, U.S. success in Afghanistan would increase with an improved ability 
to target the Taliban base in Pakistan. In Iraq, ISIS has proven that Iraqi Army forces 
were over-extended and lacking in offensive, or even defensive spirit, as we see from 
Mosul and Ramadi. Lastly, pseudo-gangs present an important offensive option in both 
Iraq and Afghanistan that has yet to be fully explored or operationalized.  
F. THE EFFICACY OF TERRORISM 
Heilbrunn preceded Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte’s discussion of 
terrorism with one of his own. Heilbrunn viewed terrorism as one of three forms of 
guerrilla warfare, the other two being the guerrilla proper (those associated with the 
romanticized image of guerrillas) and the guerrilla regular (those who have evolved into 
more formalized units almost resembling regular forces).375 In this context, terrorists aim, 
“to destroy the government’s authority and its capacity to govern … [by creating] a state 
of disorder and lawlessness and [to] force the government to resign or yield to their 
demands.”376 Terrorists employ murder, kidnap, ambush, bombings, and threats, but 
refrain from attempting to control areas or tie down enemy troops.377  
Heilbrunn asserted that terrorists only win if they begin with overwhelming 
popular support for their cause and methods. Otherwise, they risk alienating the 
population through use of their tactics. Terrorists must operate in cities to fully discredit 
the government’s ability to protect its population, destroy its prestige, and attract world 
public attention that is likely to draw international support. Heilbrunn warned that if the 
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necessary pre-conditions for a terrorism-based insurgency exist, then it is highly unlikely 
that counter-insurgency forces can win.378  
To counter terrorism, Heilbrunn recommended employing cordon-and-search, 
operations, direct military action, and counter-terrorism. Each presents its own unique 
challenges, however. Cordon-and-search capability depends on having sufficient 
targeting information prior to the operation. Direct military action requires sustained 
dominance of an area over time, and counter-terror requires precise execution to limit 
negative reaction from the general population that eventually becomes counter-
productive.379 Later, Heilbrunn revised his counter-terror assessment by arguing that 
police work is the sole solution—a notion that is very relevant to today’s discourse on 
counter-terrorism.380 The recent rise of international non-state actors (NSAs) that rely 
heavily on terrorism as a tactic—Al Qaeda, for example—further highlights Heilbrunn’s 
points.  
G. SUMMARY 
Heilbrunn’s work addressed irregular warfare extensively, with a particular focus 
on rear-area exploitation—a concept that appears timely with the current expansion of 
ISIS-controlled territory in the Middle East. His ideas on partisan warfare, its relationship 
to air power and nuclear war, and terrorism as a form of guerrilla warfare are equally 
important. Heilbrunn provided a framework for waging partisan warfare, based on 
auxiliary and independent models, and his rules for countering partisan threats—mined 
from key figures and episodes in military history—are worth revisiting today.  
Heilbrunn’s observations on pseudo-gangs are of especial interest. According to 
Heilbrunn, “[i]f pseudo-gangs can possibly be formed, they must be formed, in every 
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anti-guerilla war.”381 Pseudo-gangs present a low-risk, high-reward solution for 
dismantling any number of global violent, extremist groups. Similarly, it is time to 
acknowledge that the military will not always be the main effort in combatting such 
groups. What is needed is increased emphasis on cooperative police work, both 
domestically and internationally. The latter will require enhanced network development 
between U.S. police organizations and those of foreign allies.  
Heilbrunn warned, “[i]t is a grave mistake to allow the Communists everywhere 
to monopolize the guerilla movements.”382 For prudence’ sake, the United States and its 
allies must also retain the option of irregular war. As Heilbrunn observed, 
… there is no doubt that in any future war, in which the U.S.S.R. or Red 
China are involved, the Communist Party in the opposing countries will 
organize guerilla movements for the fight against the armies of their own 
countries. Together with the Soviet guerillas behind our battle line, they 
form the Communist Sixth Column.383  
This pattern has played out time and again, most recently with Russia in the 
Ukraine, suggesting that it is never too early to consider defensive measures. Heilbrunn 
declared over half a century ago that, “guerilla movements play a part in modern wars 
regardless of whether they are national or revolutionary, nuclear or conventional, global 
or localized.”384 His ideas still hold true. 
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VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Germans have demonstrated remarkable expertise in irregular warfare—an 
expertise that is overshadowed, however, by their more conspicuous conventional feats. 
In World War I, German Sturmtruppen perfected new methods for trench-line assaults, 
since adopted by the U.S. Army and others. World War II witnessed German advances in 
maneuver warfare that earned the telling label, blitzkrieg. In that same war, the Germans 
pioneered flexible defensive techniques and executed an audacious, first-of-its-kind, 
airborne invasion on a scale that has yet to be repeated. Recent U.S. Army modular 
brigade design, implemented under the leadership of Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld, also has German roots. Finally, the most cited and referenced “conventional” 
military theorist remains Prussian officer Carl von Clausewitz.  
The German irregular-warfare tradition is less recognized than its conventional 
counter-part, but equally as impressive. Clausewitz, in fact, argued that “people’s war” 
should be incorporated into the accepted conceptualization of war, not just viewed as 
banditry, not only because it offers the state a useful martial tool, but conversely, it 
presents a legitimate threat, as Napoleon discovered. Clausewitz’s chapter on people’s 
war in On War serves as a lesson for powerful nations that may be inclined to revert to 
regular warfare solutions when facing irregular threats. It has been shown that large 
formations, binding legal guidelines, and industry-driven technologies are counter-
productive against insurgencies that often “spread like fire in the heather.”385 
The fledgling U.S. Continental Army famously commissioned Prussian-born 
Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben to provide formal drill instruction. But it was a Hessian 
officer, Johann Ewald, who appreciated the Americans for their unconventional skills. As 
a jäger commander, Ewald established enduring counter-insurgency principles, fighting 
without excess and adapting to his environment. Most importantly, he respected and 
befriended the locals—all lessons that still apply in the insurgency fight today. 
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In a peripheral campaign of World War I, Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck 
distracted and drained British resources in the comparatively insignificant theater of 
German East Africa. Von Lettow’s exceptional leadership and network-management 
skills enabled the outnumbered Shutztruppe to fight directly, cede terrain, and still 
achieve strategic objectives. Von Lettow avoided defeat by frequently and dramatically 
adapting his strategy. With a nimbleness enabled by his proximity to the fight, he thrived 
by employing an irregular concept of operations—one quite dissimilar to the trench 
warfare that dominated the European continent.386 Von Lettow’s imaginative 
opportunism led to a sustained cross-border raid into Portuguese East Africa, thus 
extending and rejuvenating the life of the Schutztruppe. Current irregular warfare threats 
may necessitate a similar level of strategic flexibility. 
Otto Skorzeny, “commando extraordinaire,” rivaled the German conventional 
military achievements of World War II. This daring adventurer demonstrated how small, 
well-planned commando actions could net high strategic results. The rescue of Mussolini 
and seizure of the Hungarian Burgberg both singlehandedly shored up vital German 
alliances, thereby bolstering the German defense. Skorzeny’s success depended upon 
subtle, yet effective techniques for mitigating risk, plus his ability to strike where the 
enemy felt comfortable. Skorzeny’s commando raids, as they would today, required 
precise intelligence, specially trained and equipped units, and sufficient political will to 
authorize execution. Of the three, political will tends to be the most challenging to obtain.  
Another German officer of World War II, Friedrich August Freiherr von der 
Heydte, led the costly, but successful, airborne invasion of Crete. Years later, von der 
Heydte published Modern Irregular Warfare, in which he articulated a theory of irregular 
warfare that called for a more advanced—or in some ways more primitive—concept of 
war. He emphasized irregular warfare as a strategic option for the strong and as 
complementary to regular and nuclear warfare. Von der Heydte’s irregular-warfare model 
rivaled that of Mao Tse-Tung, but with broader application. He also helped develop early 
strategic thought on the employment of terrorism, while advancing the idea of 
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combination-type warfare, characterized by the sequencing and synergizing of irregular, 
nuclear, and/or conventional warfare. 
Finally, German academic (turned British citizen and author) Otto Heilbrunn 
systematically analyzed the subset of irregular warfare known as partisan, or guerrilla 
warfare, and provided a prescriptive guide for attacking an enemy’s rear, as well as 
recommendations for countering the same. Heilbrunn’s dual model for partisan warfare 
remains pertinent in classifying and understanding the subject, as are his ideas on partisan 
activity in combination with air power and nuclear war.  
Heilbrunn’s most significant contributions were his examination of pseudo-gang 
operations and identification of methods for combating terrorism. In his discussion of 
pseudo-gangs as a tool for countering irregular threats, Heilbrunn concluded, “if pseudo-
gangs can possibly be formed, they must be formed, in every anti-guerilla war.”387 
Heilbrunn also identified how and where terrorism works as a tactic, and shows that 
policing is the best counter-terrorism method.  
Heilbrunn wrote in the context of the Cold War, when the threat of nuclear 
weapons trumped all others. Over half a century later, we have yet to experience nuclear 
war, but the world has seen increased irregular conflicts and threats. Recent examples 
include Russian actions in the Ukraine, global Al Qaeda operations, the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the Middle East and beyond, Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram in 
East and West Africa, Abu Sayyaf in Asia, Hezbollah and Hamas in Lebanon and Israel, 
and many more. Notably, the United States also faces developing threats from within its 
own borders. In view of all that we have gleaned from the Germans, perhaps it is time to 
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